THE LONGEST WAR

PRODUCED By Paul Moorcraft and Irwin Armstrong

SCRIPT

00:01:02 – 00:01:29

Sudan has endured one of the most savage civil wars on a continent ravaged by conflict. It has been stereotyped as the Arab north repressing the Christian/animist south. Yet it is far more complex than this. The war began even before the British and Egyptians quit when Sudan became independent in 1956. This film explains how this largely unreported war was waged and how it ended.

00:01:30 – 00:02:13

The mighty Nile has always linked the history of Egypt and Sudan. In the late nineteenth century British influence became dominant and British administrators tried to curb the slave trade in the south. In 1881 the Mahdi led a national religious war against foreign influence. In 1898 an Anglo-Egyptian force defeated the Mahdi’s forces. This established British imperial control of the upper Nile, and set a precedent for great power intervention in the country. Sudan was officially ruled by Egypt and Britain.

00:02:14 – 00:02:23

But Britain took the main decisions – one of which was the establishment of a separate system of imperial government in the south of the country.

00:02:24 – 00:02:40

Britain agreed to grant Sudan independence in 1956, but a year before that a secessionist anti-Muslim military mutiny took place in the south. For the next 50 years the north-south divisions were to dominate Sudanese politics.

00:02:42 – 00:03:06

And the pattern of government in Khartoum tended to be dictated by military coups. In 1958 General Ibrahim Abbud’s coup toppled the civilian government. The military regime could not stop the ruinous civil war in the south which was led by the Anya Nya movement. Anya Nya means snake poison. And the war was indeed poison to the economic development of the country.

00:03:39 – 00:03:53

In 1964 Abbud’s junta collapsed. From 1966-9 a civilian government led the country. But the economy continued to deteriorate and another military takeover was almost inevitable.

00:03:54 – 00:04:12

In 1969 Colonel Jaafar el-Numeiri seized power in a bloodless coup. The Communist Party which had brought Numeiri to power was transformed into the Sudan Socialist Party – the sole legal political party.

00:04:13 – 00:04:29

Again the great powers intervened – this was the height of the Cold War. Khartoum was courted by both the Soviet Union and America. In 1971 some leaders of the old Sudanese Communist party were executed after a failed coup.

00:04:36 – 00:04:41

Numeiri survived the coup. He stayed in power until the mid 1980s.

00:04:45 – 00:04:58

In 1972 there was a ray of hope. The Addis Ababa agreement brought a temporary end to the war in the south. The southern region was granted self-government but not independence.

00:04:59 – 00:05:03

And then – 1978 - oil was discovered in the south.

00:05:05 – 00:05:09

Oil promised prosperity but would it be shared equally?

00:05:12 – 00:05:46

In 1983 the final and major stage of the civil war broke out. In the south the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – led by Colonel John Garang - started operations. The Movement and its army was always divided by tribal and political factors – not least whether a reformed Sudan should remain united or whether the potentially oil rich south should seek total independence and orientate its politics to the African south rather than the Islamic Arab north.

00:05:49 – 00:06:08

In 1983 President Numeiri declared Sharia Law but it was not rigorously enforced in the south, nevertheless many in the south objected to diktat by Khartoum –whether in religious, economic or political matters.

00:06:10 – 00:06:36

In April 1985, after Khartoum had been immobilized by a general strike and food riots, the military intervened again and there was an election in the north. Sadiq al-Mahdi returned to power, but the war in the south worsened and so did the economy. Conventional politics and military rule seemed to have failed – Islamic ideologues offered a different solution.

00:06:38 – 00:06:54

In June 1989 the National Salvation Revolution took over in a military coup. General Omar al-Bashir was the military figurehead, but the intellectual foundations were provided by Dr Hassan al-Turabi, an Islamic scholar.

00:06:55 – 00:06:59

Talks with the south continued but the war went on.

00:07:01 – 00:07:14

What was the war like? Very few war reporters got access to the battles. There was strict censorship in the north, and access in the south was limited not least by the difficult terrain.

00:07:55 – 00:08:03

The southern rebels fought a conventional people’s war using hit and run guerrilla tactics, although they also controlled vast swathes of territory.

00:08:06 – 00:08:21

In the south tribal hostilities often intervened, exacerbated by the government’s use of tribally based militias. Southerners often fought each other. Millions of people were displaced, with many seeking refuge in the north.

00:08:27 – 00:08:58

The Sudan People Liberation Army also received military support from Sudan’s neighbours – Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, as well as financial support from America. A variety of African-American and Christian right groups supported the southern rebellion because they characterized the war as a pro_African or Christian crusade against Arab Islam. They also accused northerners of conducting slave raids.

Interview (19996) with Turabi.

00:09:00 – 00:09:30

Turabi: Slavery, we have never known slavery in our history. It was only introduced by the – well, colonially actually in the last century. It was the Americans actually. They are – they are going towards the elections and they know the African Americans are very sympathetic with the Sudan for reasons which everyone should know. And they want to persuade the African Americans generally that the American policy against Sudan is alright because the Sudan is involved in Slavery.

00:09:30 – 00:09:46

Turabi: But even in Western Europe nobody mentioned slavery. Unless they echo America’s propaganda – is normally taken up by Europeans. There is absolutely no – no slavery in the Sudan.

00:09:46 – 00:09:52

The Sudanese army and its allied militia performed relatively well by African standards.

00:10:10 – 00:10:21

The equipment was often poorly maintained, but for 21 years their generals managed to conduct, simultaneously, a regular, semi-conventional and counter-insurgency war.

00:10:38 – 00:10:45

Air power was crucial to the north – bombing raids and the use of helicopters. The SPLA had no air power of their own.

00:10:50 – 00:10:52

Both sides committed atrocities.

00:10:55 – 00:10:58

Both sides talked at times, yet continued to fight.

00:11:03 – 00:11:22

Despite the stamina of the largely conscript forces controlled by Khartoum, it became increasingly clear that there was no outright military solution to the civil war.

The Khartoum government worked hard at mending fences with its neighbours and the Western world, but the war in the south went on.

00:11:23 – 00:11:42

Washington was hostile to the Islamic administration in Khartoum – it wrongly likened it to Iran, after the Ayattolahs took over. Washington was also concerned about the presence of Osama bin Laden – the Saudi warlord went to live in Khartoum until 1996.

00:11:43 – 00:12:10

Washington increasingly described Sudan as a terrorist state and various international sanctions were imposed by the UN, EU and US.. After the 1998 terror bombings of two US embassies in East Africa, President Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks on an alleged chemical weapons factory in Khartoum.

00:12:17 – 00:12:27

This was a mistake of huge proportions – the innocent factory mainly provided medicine to combat malaria.

00:12:38 – 00:12:43

Sudan became internationally isolated as the war in the south intensified.

00:12:48 – 00:13:02

By 1999 oil had begun to flow from Sudan and the economic gloom began to lift. But international trade encouraged international diplomacy, especially good relations with the United States.

00:13:03 – 00:13:28

Within the ruling elite in Khartoum tensions surfaced over relations with America and the conduct of the war. Hassan al Turabi – the ideological mentor of the regime – was edged out of power in 1999. Although he was to suffer a series of restrictions including imprisonment, the influence of Turabi remained powerful.

00:13:30 – 00:13:40

Amidst the politicking, the ordinary people of Sudan continued to suffer. Two millions southern refugees moved north to live in shanty towns.

00:13:42 – 00:13:50

By March 2001 the UN world Food Programme was struggling to raise funds to feed 3 million facing famine.

00:13:56 – 00:13:57

And deaths mounted too.

00:14:16 – 00:14:22

Perhaps 2 million people were killed during the war, although statistics – from bothsides – are highly questionable.

00:14:23 – 00:14:41

Oil could have saved the economy, but the SPLA army started to target oil installations and especially foreign oil workers. Peace was needed to make the oil bonanza pay. Talks in June 2001 in Nairobi failed however. The war went on.

00:14:42 – 00:14:55

In September 2001 the UN lifted the largely symbolic sanctions. And President Bush became much more active in securing a peace agreement, although US sanctions remained.

00:14:59 – 00:15:34

2002 was a year of continuing talks in Kenya. With various ceasefires, the war in the south wound down dramatically. But then suddenly in February 2003 rebels in Darfur – the size of France – started a western front in the war against Khartoum. The rebels – the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement – claimed that their region had been marginalized. The westerners wanted some of the concessions being granted to the southerners.

00:15:50 – 00:15:56

In January 2004, Khartoum sent in the army to quell the rebellion in the west.

00:16:18 – 00:16:33

So-called Janjaweed militia – allegedly supported by Khartoum – became involved in what critics compared to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Khartoum said the army was being used to control the Janjaweed.

Interview with Neils Scott, UN, OCHA.

00:16:34 – 00:17:09

To say that’s done in March 2003 is oversimplifying. I mean – it’s basically a traditional conflict, like we’ve got in lots of places in the world. The Janjaweed takes many different forms. You know, it could be a local tribal issue -- it could be local tribal conflicts. It could be plain open mandatory. It could be profiteering. It’s a fairly lawless area, Darfur at the moment.

00:17:12 – 00:17:25

The African Union sent in a few thousand troops as peacekeepers, as the UN started to investigate the causes of hundreds of thousands of Darfur refugees, many fleeing to neighbouring Chad.

Military

00:17:30 – 00:17:44

Normally we get complaints from either parties and -- normally we respond on the complaints, as quickly as possible.

00:17:44 – 00:17:50

The International Criminal Court also investigated those responsible for the killings in Darfur

00:17:56 – 00:18:02

Meanwhile, in the east of Sudan rebels formed a new united front.

00:18:05 – 00:18:18

Despite the major international diplomacy over Darfur, Washington did not want to put too much pressure on Khartoum – which weathered another coup plot, allegedly sponsored by Hassan al Turabi.

00:18:21 – 00:18:32

What mattered most to America was a final peace deal in the south – to end Africa’s longest war in the continent’s biggest state. Its oil wealth was also a key factor for Washington.

00:18:33 – 00:18:39

The deal finally came at Naivasha in Kenya in January 2005.

00:18:41 – 00:18:54

The US, Britain and Norway had worked consistently behind the scenes to bang heads together. Kenya too played a key role, as did the regional East African body, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

00:18:56 – 00:19:20

The principles of the agreement were that the south could have autonomy for six years to be followed by a referendum on secession. Oil wealth and the jobs this created were to be shared equitably. Sharia law, though, was to remain in the north. The United Nations authorized a ten-thousand strong peace-keeping force to go to the south.

00:19:23 – 00:19:32

In June the Khartoum government signed a formal reconciliation agreement which included not only the southern rebels but also another exiled group the National Democratic Alliance.

00:19:33 – 00:19:42

On 9 July former southern rebel leader John Garang was sworn in a first vice president. A new constitution was signed.

Constitution:

00:19:43 – 00:19:49

I shall be faithful and bear true allegiance to the public of the Sudan…..

00:19:50 – 00:20:05

This allowed a large degree of autonomy – and a lot of oil money – to the south.

Despite the continuing problems in the east and west, Sudan’s major obstacle to development – the war in the south – was over.

00:20:07 – 00:20:25

But then on 1 August 2005 the former rebel leader and new vice-president – John Garang – was killed in a helicopter crash. Rioting amongst southerners in Khartoum followed Garang’s death. But his legacy was maintained, the peace process held.

00:20:35 – 00:21:11

North and south distrust each other – not surprisingly after decades of broken agreements. The two regions are very different – in terrain, culture, religion and ethnicity. But the most important lesson is the energy and political investment of the major powers – especially Britain and America – in securing peace. To be sure, there was the allure of oil and concerns about the war on terror, but there is a lesson here: if there is enough concern and enough commitment by external powers, then even the toughest civil war can be resolved –this is the lesson for the rest of Africa.

Reporter – 00:21:12 – 00:21:18

How important was the pressure from countries like Britain and America on basically banging heads together?

Nhial Deng – 00:21:20 – 00:22:03

I wouldn’t talk about pressure but I think that their role was critical in terms of keeping the momentum of the negotiations. And I think that’s an area also where the eager countries and General Sumbeiywo particularly the chief mediator was quite adapt. You know there were times when the situation seemed quite hopeless. But they persevered, they were very tenacious and managed to keep the parties talking even if at times it seemed as if no progress was on the horizon. But they managed to keep the talks going and by so doing, I think they kept the talks on until such time as when we achieved break-throughs.

Reporter – 00:22:04 – 00:22:13

This combination of British and American pressure and Norwegian pressure plus mediation from Kenya etc. Do you think this is a model for resolving other African conflicts?

Nhial Deng – 00:22:16 – 00:23:12

Well I think conflicts vary, there are different situations. Maybe in our situation the role of these countries was quite critical. I think the role played by the United States in particular instead of the John Danforth was quite instrumental in achieving a break through. I think there are adequate safe guards for this agreement to last that have been built into that agreement itself, especially the idea of having or maintaining the SPLA and the Sudan armed forces… Of course the United Nations peace support mission, the assessment and evaluation commission which will basically be evaluating the implementation of the peace agreement – just making sure that the parties adhere to their commitments under the peace agreement. So I think there are quite a number of safe guards that should be adequate to assure that the parties adhere to their commitments.

00:23:13 – 00:23:28

Meanwhile, the oil money has rapidly improved the economy, this is particularly noticeable in the capital. This poor country has a projected figure of one million barrels a day by 2006. This money can be spent on reconstruction after the long war.

00:23:30 – 00:23:44

Traffic jams, mobile phones, and new shopping malls are all signs of increasing prosperity.The influx of diplomats and southern leaders has made Khartoum a more cosmopolitan city.

00:23:45 – 00:23:54

But now the wealth has to spread to the countryside – north and south. And that means real peace – and not just in the south.

00:23:57 – 00:24:01

Even if peace holds, oil is not the panacea for Sudan.

Professor Sean O’Fahey:

00:24:01 –00:24:38

Unfortunately of course, as we know from Nigeria and elsewhere, oil and African countries don’t necessarily always go together. When I see how difficult it has been for my adopted home – Norway – to deal with oil weather – smaller, homogenous, highly developed social welfare democracy – we’ve had endless problems. I emphasize this. I am much more compassionate about the difficulties that governments like the Nigerian government or the one or the two governments here are going to face in digesting that kind of oil wealth.

00:24:39 – 00:24:58

Africa’s longest war looks like it is really over. Now Sudan – with its marvelous history, archaeology and economic potential and a people famous for its hospitality can look to opening up their country. And this all depends upon peace.