|
IRAQ: The Morning After
42 minutes
02:38 |
PETER
GEORGE, REPORTER |
In a small
town south of Washington DC lives a man who would be president of Iraq. He's waiting
for two events -- the fall of Saddam Hussein and a call from the Iraqi
people. |
02:55 |
BRIGADIER
GENERAL NAJIB AL-SALHI (TRANSLATION) |
If the
people call on me to take on such a responsibility, I'm prepared to shoulder
it. |
03:05 |
PETER GEORGE |
Across the
Atlantic waits the man who would be king. 44 years in
exile, he waits with mounting anticipation for the moment of his return to
Baghdad. |
03:18 |
SHARIF ALI
BIN AL-HUSSEIN |
It's
something that one has been working towards all my life. And to actually finally have it in one's sight is an
indescribable feeling. |
03:32 |
PETER GEORGE |
And the man
who would be powerbroker -- power walking through life, racing to bring about
the ultimate confrontation. |
03:43 |
AHMAD
CHALABI, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS |
Well, we
make no bones about it. We want
United States help to remove Saddam from power. |
03:51 |
PETER GEORGE |
Amongst
Iraqi exiles, there's growing euphoria. They're
counting down the days until America strikes and new leaders emerge to take
Iraq into the future. But those
who would lead are at loggerheads, consumed by infighting, divided by
religion, tribe, ethnicity, politics and by lust for power. |
04:16 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE |
Every single
one of them believes that he alone, you know, is the -- is the anointed next
leader of Iraq. And -- that
just doesn't work. |
04:33 |
PETER GEORGE |
Yet from
this fractured leadership, America is trying to cobble together a coalition
that will convince the world it has a plan -- any plan at all -- to stop Iraq
falling into chaos if it succeeds in ousting Saddam Hussein. |
|
CAPTION |
The Morning After
|
|
PETER GEORGE |
9,500km from
Baghdad and hidden in the anonymity of a working-class town in middle
America, an Iraqi general sits at a kitchen table and plots the fall of
Saddam Hussein. Brigadier
General Najib al-Salhi, Chief of Staff, First Mechanised Division, Fifth
Corps of the Iraqi Army, until he defected seven years ago. |
05:33 |
BRIGADIER
GENERAL NAJIB AL-SALHI (TRANSLATION) |
I personally
don't think Saddam would have the opportunity to use chemical weapons. |
05:42 |
PETER GEORGE |
He uses a
borrowed map to explain how America can invade his own country. The details
he saves for chats he says he has with the CIA and the Pentagon. The general
believes Iraqis will need a man of sound military experience to hold the country
together in the immediate aftermath of Saddam. |
06:06 |
BRIGADIER GENERAL NAJIB AL-SALHI |
There's a
real danger that if a professional military officer without an instinct for
democracy or human rights grabbed power, he'd just hold on to it because the
region has a history of encouraging dictatorships. |
06:37 |
PETER GEORGE |
Al-Salhi
sees himself as a future contender as president of Iraq. But for now,
he does his own chores, prefers anonymity, chooses his meeting places
carefully and is fussy about who he talks to. Even in
American suburbia, he knows his ambitions can be dangerous. He's already
had a warning from Baghdad in the form of a videotape sent to him after his
defection. It showed
his sister being raped. |
07:10 |
BRIGADIER GENERAL NAJIB AL-SALHI |
Anyone who
speaks out against Saddam is seen as a threat and as an enemy. |
07:24 |
PETER GEORGE |
At 51,
al-Salhi's days of riding tanks are over. But he
thinks his military background would help him become a good president He modestly
states a recent opinion poll on an Internet site for Iraqi exiles chose him
as the preferred leader, but adds the poll was taken off the web by jealous
rivals. |
07:48 |
BRIGADIER GENERAL NAJIB AL-SALHI |
That's why
if we establish a real democracy in Iraq and everyone has enough freedom to
decide who should lead them in the future, I think I'd have a good chance. |
08:19 |
PETER GEORGE |
As plans for
an American jihad against Saddam advance, some in the administration argue
only a military strongman could hold Iraq together in the aftermath. Al-Salhi's
name is bandied about, if only because the most prominent exiled general is
facing a war crimes investigation in Denmark over the use of chemical weapons
in the Iran-Iraq War. |
08:46 |
BOB BAER,
FORMER CIA, MIDDLE EAST |
He could go
back and set up a military government to replace Saddam, which is the most
logical thing to do if you're really interested in holding this country
together. What you
don't -- can't introduce into Iraq today is democracy. It would be
total chaos. |
09:03 |
PETER GEORGE |
Any talk of
an American-sponsored military strongman raises alarm bells amongst most
opposition figures, particularly Shiah Muslims, like Hamid al-Bayati, who
comprise 60 per cent of the Iraqi population and who have suffered at the
hands of a Sunni-dominated army. Al-Bayati represents the Supreme Council of
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shiah opposition group with Iranian
backing. |
09:33 |
DR HAMID
AL-BAYATI, SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ |
- [PG] So
the idea that Iraq needs a strongman is complete anathema to you, is it? - Exactly
so. I think this is a myth and a strongman will cause chaos, as Saddam did.
And then we will see another war because there is tension between Iraq and
neighbouring countries. If we have a new weak regime, then we might have more
troubles. |
10:07 |
PETER GEORGE |
Another
city, another continent, another climate and another plan for a brighter
Iraqi future. |
10:20 |
SHARIF ALI
BIN AL-HUSSEIN |
This is King
Faisal II, the last king of Iraq. He was
assassinated when he was 23 years old. I was a
young child at the time. I was just almost two, in fact. |
10:33 |
PETER GEORGE |
Sharif Ali
bin al-Hussein. Spirited out
of Baghdad in 1958 in the wake of his uncle's assassination, he's never been
back home. |
10:42 |
SHARIF ALI
BIN AL-HUSSEIN |
It was the
beginning of -- of the bloody history, because it undermined the legitimacy
of the government and it enabled anybody who had the opportunity to get on a
tank to assume government. And the
problem then became that that was the only way to stay in power and there has
been a direct line to Saddam Hussein |
11:10 |
PETER GEORGE |
Sharif Ali
is a 42nd-generation descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. Like General
al-Salhi in America, he sees himself as someone around whom a shattered
nation can coalesce. |
11:22 |
SHARIF ALI
BIN AL-HUSSEIN |
- Some form
of figurehead, some form of uniting influence is needed in a country that has
been divided by Saddam Hussein. - [PG] And for you, an obvious possibility, at
least then, must be the monarchy? - Well, from
the feedback that we get from inside Iraq, it gives us a great deal of
confidence that that is what is required by the Iraqi people. That is what
they want. |
11:47 |
DR HAMID
AL-BAYATI |
- [PG] Do
you think that's a likely outcome or not? - I don't
see it as a likely outcome. As we know, the monarchy was demolished in 1958.
It's difficult to restore monarchy in 2002. |
12:06 |
PETER GEORGE |
In the eyes
of America's European allies, the inability of opposition leaders to agree on
a shape for a future Iraqi government is a critical flaw. And it's a
failure acknowledged by one of Washington's most influential proponents of
ousting Saddam. |
12:29 |
RICHARD
PERLE, CHAIRMAN, US DEFENSE POLICY BOARD |
- [PG] But
isn't it an almost fatal situation to be possibly so close to the toppling of
Saddam and for no-one to have emerged like that? - Well, I
think we should have started on this a long time ago. And the political
strategy has lagged behind our thinking about how to
deal with Saddam in a physical sense. But I think now we will begin to see
the pace quicken and there will be more political activity rather than less. |
12:58 |
PETER GEORGE |
In London, a
rare and extraordinary gathering of men who prefer to live in the shadows. Under
American pressure to put on a public exhibition of unity, opposition leaders
are meeting to announce the formation of a new military council intended to
take control of the Iraqi Army when Saddam falls. |
13:21 |
SHEIK
MOHAMMED MOHAMMED ALI, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS |
- [REPORTER]
So how do you feel about talk of having a military man in the interim for
some period until elections are organised? Would that worry you? - Well, if
this military man is working for a political role, well, he is most welcome. |
13:42 |
PETER GEORGE |
One of the
leaders of this new council is General al-Salhi, visiting from America to
make his pitch. But for all
the show of unity, there are boycotts. One general
accuses the new military council of simply grabbing power from a
well-established outfit that he leads. |
14:04 |
GENERAL
FAWZI AL-SHAMARI |
- I was, you
know -- decided not to go because we already established that two years ago. - [PG] So if
there was already a military council established, why did they decide to try
and set up another one? -
I think right now, some politicians are
playing a role and using some factions here. And I think that's not a healthy
condition for us. We have to be united. |
14:34 |
PETER GEORGE |
Back at the
conference, there's more confusion for observers trying to read the winds of
the exile movement. Jordan's
influential Prince Hassan turns up unexpectedly and causes a stir that will
ripple around the Arab world. And with a
kiss, he seems to bestow his blessing and support on his cousin Sharif Ali,
the man who would be King of Iraq With this
one appearance, the Prince has broken Arab unity opposing America's plans for
Iraq, to the embarrassment of his own government and to the delight of the
exiled opposition. |
15:16 |
PRINCE
HASSAN OF JORDAN -- SPEAKING TO MEETING (TRANSLATION) |
It was a
surprise to be invited to observe this meeting. |
15:26 |
AHMAD
CHALABI |
Prince
Hassan is a man of enormous influence and standing in the Arab world and
internationally and we welcome his presence. |
15:50 |
PETER GEORGE |
Nowadays,
Bob Baer watches with a degree of cynical detachment as Iraqi opposition
leaders ride the wave of American threats to dispose of Saddam. |
|
BOB BAER |
- It really
turned into a beautiful day, didn't it? - Yeah, it
really did. - How much
farther could it be from the Middle East, sitting right here? It's nice
weather. We're not getting shot at. There's no coups
going on. |
16:11 |
PETER GEORGE |
A 20-year
veteran of the CIA's Middle East operations, Baer reflects the views of the
many pragmatists of the CIA and the State Department. They're
mounting a rearguard action against the influence of what they see as the
unrealistic ideologues urging the Bush Administration to act without any
clear idea of the consequences. |
16:35 |
BOB BAER |
What
everybody knows in Washington is that there's no endgame plan. Who's going
to replace Saddam? They don't have the slightest idea. What's going
to happen to the minority Sunni community? Nobody knows. Do you have
to go in and destroy the military which would create a vacuum in Iraq? No-one's
dealing with that. But you have
a -- almost a segregated class in Washington, which they call the
neo-conservatives, who have made up their mind without any facts or any
intellectual backing what they want to do. It's
impossible to put democracy into Iraq. That country's
never had a democracy. It's going to take years. |
17:14 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUE |
Bob Baer,
with his experience on the ground -- and until you said that, I had a lot of
respect for him -- should know that the Iraqi people can do better than that. |
17:24 |
PETER GEORGE |
Danielle
Pletka, Vice-President, Foreign and Defense Policy, American Enterprise
Institute, a neo-conservative think tank that is helping drive the US agenda
on Iraq. These
neo-cons have a direct line into the White House through Vice-President Dick
Cheney and powerful backers like Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz in
Defense who see Iraq as the next step in the War on Terror and an opportunity
to establish a democratic pro-Western beachhead in the Middle East. |
18:01 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA |
- You either
stand up for what is right and you work for it and you try and attain it,
with the understanding all the while that you may not get there and that it
takes a lot of political capital and that it takes a lot of serious
commitment and that you may not be 100 per cent up to the job in the end. But
I mean, to fight for nothing? Why? - [PG] If
you may not be up to it in the end, that means… - Well, you
may not get a perfect result. -
[PG] You have to live with the prospect of failure. - You have to live with the prospect… - [PG] The
prospect of failure will be a very expensive one, won't it, in people's
lives? -
I think getting rid of Saddam is a
success in and of itself. |
18:37 |
BOB BAER |
When Saddam
falls, if he ever does, if he doesn't die in his bed, widespread violence is
going to occur. The chances
of civil war are very high. And whoever
is spewed up from this chaos, we don't know who it is. |
18:54 |
RICHARD
PERLE, CHAIRMAN, US DEFENSE POLICY BOARD |
Well, I
don't know quite how you'd respond to that. Maybe Mr
Baer knows something that I don't know. |
19:00 |
PETER GEORGE |
Richard
Perle, one of Washington's principal neo-cons, Chairman of the influential US
Defense Policy Board. |
19:08 |
RICHARD
PERLE |
- I simply
think he's wrong about that. - [PG] Why? -
Well, he's guessing that -- that removing
Saddam will be difficult. I think it will turn out to be much easier than
many people think -
[PG] But you're guessing also, aren't you? -
Yes, of course. We're both guessing. I just
think he's made the wrong guess. - [PG] One
may be right and one may be wrong. -
Well, one of us is going to be right. |
19:34 |
PETER GEORGE |
In such an
overheated climate, it's hardly surprising that the Americans are confused
and frustrated by the babble of conflicting Iraqi opposition leaders, each
struggling to make their voices heard. By some
counts, there are now more than 50 opposition groups, each claiming support
from within Iraq, but none able to prove it. |
19:56 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA |
Everybody
wants to get the access, everybody wants to get the pat on the head from the
Vice President or the President or the Secretary of State, and so they're all
fighting about that and they'll continue to fight about that until the United
States puts its foot down. Uh, wait, I
have another cliche coming -- knocks a few heads together and says, you know,
"Either get along or get out." |
20:15 |
HOSHYAR
ZEBARI, KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY |
To bang
heads together, to produce one single leader, I doubt if it would work in the
Iraqi context. -
[PG] It'd be a failure? -
It would be, um -- it would be a failure and,
er, it has to be done through other means than
banging heads. |
20:34 |
RICHARD
PERLE |
Sometimes it
takes banging heads together. We should be
looking for someone who can bring the Iraqi people together, who can be a
moral force as well as a political figure. |
20:44 |
PETER GEORGE |
Richard
Perle reckons he's found just such a man in his friend and political ally
Ahmad Chalabi -- the most controversial figure in the Iraqi opposition
movement. Leader of
the Iraqi National Congress, or INC -- an opposition umbrella group formed 10
years ago -- Chalabi struggles daily to stop the group fragmenting and to
hose down constant personality clashes. Today in
London he's dealing with another general threatening to form yet another
breakaway military council -- this one reportedly designed to preserve Sunni
influence in a post-Saddam army. It's a
closed-door meeting that ends with a display of unity that is only skin deep. |
21:39 |
MAJOR
GENERAL WAFIQ SAMARAI, FORMER HEAD IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (TRANSLATION) |
The
opposition is fragmented with differing intentions and aims. They can't
agree on one core goal. Without
strong control they will simply take this disease of disunity back into Iraq. |
21:59 |
PETER GEORGE |
Urbane,
frenetic and with the determination of a zealot, Chalabi is by turns loved
and loathed by US powerbrokers. |
22:10 |
AHMAD
CHALABI |
We are
difficult allies. We have an
agenda for the liberation of our country and we have a relationship with the
United States Government in all its aspects. We have
different views sometimes on how to proceed with the liberation of our
country. They have
some, er, some traditionally-held views which we believe are erroneous and no
longer valid. |
22:45 |
PETER GEORGE |
But amongst
the neo-cons and Republican right in Congress, Chalabi's found a natural
constituency of powerbrokers who believe the US should have destroyed Saddam
after the Gulf War. He's spent
10 years drip-feeding them with reports from defectors about Saddam's plans
to develop weapons of mass destruction, and more recently, with alleged links
between Saddam and the al-Qaeda network. And he's won
the powerful American Jewish lobby by holding out the prospect of a
democratic Iraq signing a peace deal with Israel. |
23:24 |
RICHARD
PERLE |
- Ahmad
Chalabi has certainly led the opposition for many years, has led it in a very
positive direction -- that is with a, um -- a policy that calls for the
establishment of democratic institutions and the renunciation of weapons of
mass destruction and a positive approach to the peace process in the region.
Now, you can't get a better platform than that from the point of view of any
Western liberal democracy. -
[PG} So he is the West's man in that sense? - I think he
very much reflects Western values, which is not surprising -- he has a PhD in
mathematics, trained in the West. And at the same time, he comes from a
distinguished Iraqi family and has devoted his life to trying to produce a
unified opposition to Saddam Hussein. |
24:17 |
PETER GEORGE |
The INC
still likes to remain discreet about its location, but unlike the backroom
operations of other opposition groups, Chalabi's built a formidable base in
London largely funded by the US Government. There's a
smooth public relations department and lobbyists who know how to sell the
cause. |
24:41 |
INC STAFFER
(READING EMAIL) |
- "In
Finland every development concerning the Iraqi situation is keenly followed
and 'Keskisuomalainen' would be eager to hear the authentic voices of the
Iraqi opposition in its pages." -
[CHALABI] OK, we accept. |
24:59 |
INC STAFFER
(SPEAKING ON PHONE) |
If the
President justified the link between al-Qa'ida and Iraq, the US could get
blanket permission by the Senate to go to war, which is great news. |
25:10 |
PETER GEORGE |
It was from
the Washington office, with endless meetings in the boardroom, that Chalabi,
the neo-conservatives and their friends in Congress parlayed the opposition's
greatest coup in 1998. They forced
a reluctant Clinton Administration to accept the Iraq Liberation Act -- a law
that made support for Saddam's opposition official US policy. |
25:41 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA |
He's a pest. He gets in
because he fights to get in because he makes the connections
he needs to make to get the access he needs to get to get the profile for the
cause, and he's really serious about that and you have to admire it. |
25:59 |
PETER GEORGE |
Such success
is all the more remarkable because Chalabi is deeply
distrusted in a deeply divided administration. Detractors
in the State Department and the CIA accuse him of over-selling the INC's
capacity to provide leadership, to gather useful intelligence and to command
an insurrection from within Iraq with American military assistance. |
26:25 |
BOB BAER |
The support
from the professionals is -- is -- is very -- I mean, there is none. I mean, the
CIA, as I understand, has cut off contact with Chalabi -- Ahmad Chalabi, the
leader of the INC. Uh -- they
have infrequent contact with the opposition, and it's just to figure out if
anything new appears. But the CIA
has stated, and on good grounds, that the opposition alone cannot get rid of
Saddam Hussein. It's impossible. And to say
today it's all changed, and that suddenly the opposition has sterling
intelligence and a capability of leading an insurrection, is a fantasy. |
27:08 |
RICHARD
PERLE |
- [PG] Why
then the disapproval of the State Department and the CIA of Dr Chalabi? - I think
he's too independent for their tastes. The CIA likes people that it can put
on the payroll and simply instruct, and the State Department, uh -- has
similar tendencies. And, uh -- Ahmad Chalabi speaks his mind. It's one of the
reasons why he's a leader. |
27:28 |
AHMAD
CHALABI |
We make no
bones about it -- we want United States help to remove Saddam from power. We are not
acting in an irresponsible way. We want to remove Saddam. Now,
Congress has said, "Help those people inside Iraq." There is the
Iraq Liberation Act, which says the United States policy is to help those
Iraqis remove Saddam from power and establish democracy in Iraq. That's the
intent and the language of the Iraq Liberation Act. |
27:57 |
PETER GEORGE |
Compounding
distrust in Washington is distrust of Chalabi amongst Iraqis themselves who
are uneasy about his deep ties with the Americans. |
28:10 |
DR HAMID
AL-BAYATI, SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ |
- The INC
undermined the reputation of the opposition when they received public
American money, and when they received American training. We are independent.
We want to be independent. - [PG] So
you see the INC and Mr Chalabi as, to some extent, a puppet of the State
Department, of the CIA, of the -- of the Pentagon? - Not
necessarily so, but if an organisation receives American money, then they have to comply with their conditions. And right now, the
only organisation we left in the INC are the Kurdish movements. The
nationalists is outside, like the INA, the Islamists
are outside, the leftists are outside. |
28:56 |
AHMAD
CHALABI |
Everyone
wants to have their point of view, but my own way -- the paramount aim for me
is to build a consensus of the Iraqi opposition forces, and to build this
consensus for the benefit of the Iraqi people towards democracy. |
29:16 |
PETER GEORGE |
More
divisive still, there's serious opposition to Chalabi's gung-ho attitude
towards US military intervention to topple Saddam. |
29:26 |
DR HAMID
AL-BAYATI |
We believe
that America shouldn't invade Iraq. We have an alternative strategy. We told the
Americans that we believe that the Americans should work through the
international legitimacy, which is the UN resolutions to protect Iraqi
people. And then
Iraqi people will be able to overthrow the regime, as they did in 1991. They
were nearly overthrowing the regime, but the Americans decided to stand with
Saddam against the uprising of 1991. |
29:54 |
HOSHYAR
ZEBARI |
- Unlike
many exile groups or leaders who have no responsibilities, we have a
responsibility towards three-and-a-half million people, and the Kurdish
leadership cannot afford to make any more mistakes. -
[PG] Can you assess for me the problem of
disunity amongst the Iraqi opposition? -
Most of the opposition groups are not based
inside the country -- like the Kurds, for instance. Therefore, they lack
credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people. And the other reason is really
there are too many chiefs and very few Indians, as they say. |
30:58 |
PETER GEORGE |
From Europe
to the Middle East, the disunity within the Iraqi opposition and America's
failure to articulate a cohesive strategy to stop Iraq fracturing in civil
war if Saddam falls is causing deep unease. In Jordan, a
long-time friend of the US, there is despair at the consequences of the
superpower trying to impose its will on the region. |
31:25 |
SHAHER BAK,
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JORDAN |
- What would
happen to Iraq? Would it integrate into three states? -
[PG] Do you worry it would disintegrate? -
Well, very. Disintegrate Iraq into three
states… -
[PG] And is that a serious concern? - That's a
very serious concern, naturally. Well, what would happen to the system of a
country, which is an important country, which we hoped that it would play a
moderate stabilising factor in the region? It would become sort of this
factor of destabilising the area, all over the region. -
[PG] Well, some would say that it's already a
destabilising factor in the region… - Well, it's
a political argument which you can put it the way you want. The question is,
is the bad thing you know better than the things which you don't know? |
32:13 |
PETER GEORGE |
What's known
as 'the Arab street' -- public opinion -- is already deeply suspicious of US
intentions because of America's unswerving support for Israel in the conflict
with the Palestinians. And beyond
that, Arab economies and confidence are still reeling from a decade of events
that include the Gulf War and the aftershocks of September 11. Arab
traders, as good a litmus test as any, despair at the trend to more conflict. |
32:46 |
MAN |
Our economy
will be bad if there is a war. There is a
relation between Iraq and Jordan by trading. And if there is a war, they will
stop all trading. |
32:57 |
SHAHER BAK |
This
military action could have very serious negative consequences on the state of
Iraq, on the Iraqi people themselves and on the neighbouring countries. |
33:12 |
PETER GEORGE |
As for the
Iraqi opposition in exile, Arab opinion is at best cynical, at worst derisive
-- particularly for Ahmad Chalabi, who's best remembered in Jordan as the man
whose bank collapsed in a major financial scandal 13 years ago. |
33:29 |
LABIB
KAMHAWI, POLITICAL ANALYST, JORDAN |
The
Americans have been trying to pump life into this opposition for two years
now and they have failed. This is a
mockery. It's not opposition. It's a bunch of thugs. Some of them are
convicted even in Jordan. The head of
the opposition assembly, Mr Chalabi, is sentenced in Jordan for syphoning
maybe more than $200 million out of the bank that he was managing. So
you're talking about people who lack the ability, who have no base in their
own homeland. |
34:00 |
SHAHER BAK |
Well, you
know Ahmad Chalabi is wanted here, so we don't trust him. |
34:05 |
PETER GEORGE |
Wanted back
in Jordan, that is, to serve a 20-year jail sentence imposed by a military
court over the 1989 collapse of the bank he owned. Jordan's
Central Bank says he left debts amounting to the equivalent of 10 per cent of
Jordan's economy at the time. It was a
notorious case that still evokes controversy in financial circles at all
levels. |
34:30 |
MOHAMMED
SAID NABULSI, FORMER GOVERNOR, CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN |
The criminal
proceedings that established the criminal acts of Petra and Chalabi were also
translated through civil proceedings which condemned Chalabi and his family
and others to an amount of almost half a billion dollars. |
34:52 |
AHMAD
CHALABI |
- No, that's
a false claim. The military court made the judgement. We were not permitted
to defend ourselves. We were tried in absentia and every co-defendant with me
on any charge was exonerated. In fact, the governor of the Central Bank made
it his own mission to try to engineer a collapse of the bank. We withstood
this. -
[PG] This is Mr Nabulsi? -
Yes, he thought that I was responsible for
his dismissal as governor of the Central Bank in 1985. -
[PG] So this is a personal vendetta, you say? -
And he continued to bear the scars. I have no
vendetta with him. |
35:34 |
MOHAMMED
SAID NABULSI |
This is the
total sum of the investigation committee's reports. |
35:40 |
PETER GEORGE |
The Governor
rejects claims of vendetta and he has tomes not just from the court
proceedings but of independent and government investigations as testament to
the draining of the bank's accounts. |
35:53 |
MOHAMMED
SAID NABULSI |
There is no
question whatever in my mind because most of the embezzlement and the fraud
actions were made directly by him and in the interests of himself, his family
and other institutions outside the country that he established in Lebanon and
Switzerland. |
36:15 |
AHMAD
CHALABI |
If my aim
was enrichment, if my aim was to acquire wealth in this ill-used way, then
why would I go and risk my life and put my family and myself in this extreme
danger and withstand all these public attacks, rather than go and enjoy the
ill-gotten gains that I was supposed to have made? |
36:48 |
PETER GEORGE |
In the Arab
world, the stain of a very public financial scandal is permanent. But it
doesn't matter a damn to his American boosters. |
36:58 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA |
- But it is absolutely immaterial. I mean, it's unfortunate… -
[PG] Well, it it has to
be material if you see him as a leader and a spokesman of the Iraqi cause. -
No. It doesn't matter. You pick a person for
a cause and you go forward for their ability to keep the group together and
for their commitment to that cause, and you view them all the while as a
transitional figure that either will or will not be able to prove themselves
to the Iraqi people. |
37:26 |
PETER GEORGE |
No-one knows
just how Chalabi or the rest of the opposition
forces are viewed from Baghdad. But American
neo-cons whip up the image of benign ripples from a Western-style democracy
flowing from Iraq into neighbouring dictatorships, like another one of George
W Bush's 'axis of evil' nations -- Iran. |
37:48 |
RICHARD
PERLE |
- It will
give tremendous hope to those who are in similar situations, who are ruled by
people they never chose, in a manner that they despise. -
[PG] These, of course, would be dictators who are
as much America's friends in the Middle East as they are enemies. -
Well, they, uh -- this -- this – -
[PG] The Saudis, for instance. -
This will include a number
of -- of regimes, certainly the Iranian regime. The mullahs would be
removed tomorrow if you had a free vote in -- in Iran. -
[PG] But the Saudis also. -
Well, I don't know about the Saudis. -
[PG] Possibly the Kuwaitis. -
I don't know about the Saudis or the -- or
the Kuwaitis. |
38:27 |
PETER GEORGE |
US
strategists may not wish to face the prospect that a free vote for Iraqis on
the morning after Saddam could even present an opportunity to the mullahs of
Iran. Iraq's 60
per cent Shiah community, with its religious and political ties with Teheran,
could easily swamp the Sunni Arab vote, while the Kurds in the north also
have political ties with the Iranians. |
38:57 |
DANIELLE
PLETKA |
- [PG] And
could the United States stomach a leader that came from a possibly
Teheran-leaning Shiah? - That's a
very interesting question. I mean, I guess if you're in for a dime, you're in
a for a dollar, and you should probably stand up for the things you believe
in. In other words, you should stand up for democracy. I think we
have to recognise that if the Shiah are going to have a role in this, which
they are and they must, that the Iranians are going
to have an interest in this. Do we want
the Iranians to have a controlling interest? No. No question. We don't want
the Iranis to have a controlling interest. To the
contrary, we want Iraq to be the exemplar for Iran, and then get rid of those
guys. |
39:35 |
PETER
GEORGE
|
Amidst such
uncertainty grows a conviction on all sides that George W Bush can hardly
afford to back down now on his threats to get rid of the man who, less than
20 years ago, was lauded and supported by America as a bulwark of the region. Saddam's
people are certainly taking the threat seriously. |
39:58 |
DR SABAH
YASSIN, IRAQI AMBASSADOR, JORDAN (TRANSLATION) |
- [PG] Is it
your belief that no matter what Iraq says or does now, that George Bush is
determined to move against the President of Iraq? - Yes, we
think so. No matter how much Iraq cooperates with the UN and Security
Council. It's a new development in international relations when a US
president decides he's in charge of changing regimes around the world. |
40:31 |
RICHARD
PERLE |
- The
combination of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction is a threat
that is too serious to go unanswered, and the only plausible answer is to
remove him from office. So
I believe that the decision has been made by the American president that that
will be the policy of the United States. - [PG] So
it's no longer a question of if but when? -
It's a question of when. |
41:08 |
PETER GEORGE |
'When?' is
the question that preoccupies hundreds of thousands of Iraqi exiles across
the globe as they await with a mixture of anticipation and apprehension
America's decision to launch its assault on Saddam. Most Iraqis
do not believe Saddam's had his last bark, or last bite. They know
him well. They know his wily resistance and his ability to split his enemies
in the West and the Iraqi opposition itself. |
42:16 |
PETER GEORGE |
Back in a
town somewhere in America, far from the front line, opposition figures remain
so wary that it's taken several weeks to arrange this meeting through an
intermediary with another former general. |
|
GENERAL
FAWZI AL-SHAMARI |
-[PG] Hello, I'm
Peter George, ABC Australia. Nice to meet you. -
How are you? -
[PG] Do you feel insecure here? Do you think there
really is a threat? - No, I'm
secure, but we have to be cautious because Saddam
Hussein is following everybody. |
42:47 |
PETER GEORGE |
This is a
critical, dangerous, but inspiring time, says General al-Shamari. So
it's high time the opposition puts aside its differences and starts to work
with unity for the common cause. |
43:00 |
GENERAL
FAWZI AL-SHAMARI |
- They are
very sincere to overthrow the regime, but they only think we need just to
defeat the selfishness within ourselves and build a bridge of trust among us,
they will do the job. -
[PG] When you talk about selfishness amongst
yourselves, what do you mean? -
Some people still have an attitude to work individually and… -
[PG] Is that because each one wants to be the next
leader of their nation? -
Right, right. -
[PG] Is it a bit of a danger, though, that the
factional nature of Iraqis in exile, the politicians and the military people,
means that it will undermine efforts to both get rid of Saddam and also to rebuild the country afterwards? -
Right. I agree with that. |
43:57 |
PETER GEORGE |
Many believe
America's already set off on its crusade against Saddam, and that getting rid
of him may even prove the easy part of the job. Cobbling
together a new leadership strong enough to hold this fractious, oil-rich and
strategically important nation together is a more difficult proposition, and
it's hardly begun. The evidence
is that military plans for a march on Baghdad are detailed and well advanced. But the
planning for what happens next seems no more substantial than a desert
breeze. |
44:52 |
|
ENDS
|
For ABC AUSTRALIA