COLGAN: Dr Hans Blix, thanks for joining us on Foreign Correspondent. When you look at the intelligence material, the information that you received from the British and the Americans, were you convinced that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction and that they posed a clear and present danger?
DR HANS BLIX: No you see we had a more prudent attitude and I want to have evidence and of course we were aware that there were lots of things unaccounted for. That of course could mean that they had hidden it somewhere, they could be somewhere but it was not evidenced and that's why I warned against the idea of, or jumping to the conclusion, that something that is unaccounted for does not exist, that's not certain. That still is to be found out. We cannot exclude it and the allied coalition is urging us to have patience, well may be they will find something but they have not found very much yet at any rate.
COLGAN: If you look at the interpretation that the Americans took on their intelligence material, we can't exclude the notion that Iraq did have and does have weapons of mass destruction and that they did pose a clear and present danger - isn't that true?
DR HANS BLIX: That's possible. They could have them and if they assume that they had them well then they could pose a danger though Iraq as a whole of course could not pose the same danger in 2003 as they did in 1991. I mean the army was a fraction of what they had in the past. No one believed that today they would have any nuclear weapons so they must have been a much smaller danger than they were in the past.
COLGAN: If Saddam had nothing to hide, had no weapons of mass destruction, he could have opened the doors. Do you believe that the US is right in interpreting his actions as those of a man who has something to hide and that that something was weapons of mass destruction.
DR HANS BLIX: If in due course no one finds anything, then that interpretation was wrong. Then you have to find some other reason why they behaved as they did and there can be several ideas in this regard. I think my favourite speculation or hypothesis would be pride, that they felt these are impostors, these are international inspectors and we are proud people, we have had to accept them but not one inch more than the resolutions really require and hence the very rigid attitude against them.
COLGAN: While your inspectors were in Iraq, the US did give you tips as to sites, locations - none of those turned up weapons of mass destruction and you've been surprised and said you were surprised that that was the case. Do you believe the information they gave you was good information?
DR HANS BLIX: We got a good many tips as to sites to go to and we went to many of them but in only in three of those cases did we find anything and in none of these cases was weapons of mass destruction so that shook me a bit, I admit and that was also a reason why I said, I stated publicly in the Security Council that intelligence had not led us there. This means no negative attitude intended, I think it's necessary and it's a difficult job they have.
COLGAN: But if their intelligence material, the intelligence tip-off they gave you led you to nothing substantial, does it now make you doubt the value of the intelligence material that they used to justify this warning.
DR HANS BLIX: I think one will always have to look at it in a critical sense just as a court will always look at evidence presented to it in a critical mind and we did that at all times.
COLGAN: Can you describe for me then your, the sentiments that you were feeling in those last days when you were realising that time really was running out. Was it a sense of frustration or were you quite resigned to the circumstances?
DR HANS BLIX: Well somewhere in between I would say. Of course I would have loved to go on and to find out and to achieve a peaceful solution of this and I think it would be paradoxical if eventually they find out there is nothing. They had many other reasons to go to war, we now learn, I mean the weapons of mass destruction was the one that was projected and I think it was real - but we hear of many other reasons at the moment, may be something good will come out of it but a lot of people have died as well and a lot of negative things come out as well. Inspection is a very inexpensive way of going about things. They cost like $80 million a year and what the Americans do in the war perhaps costs $80 billion so it's much cheaper in terms of money but also much cheaper in terms of loss of life.
COLGAN: Do you suspect that the inspectors would be allowed back in once you go, that perhaps you're the barrier to the US allowing inspectors back into Iraq?
DR HANS BLIX: I'm not so sure, I think it's been said on the American side that it's nothing personal.
COLGAN: Do you think perhaps your crime though in the eyes of the US is that you were too independent, you didn't do enough of what the US wanted you to do?
DR HANS BLIX: Yes.
COLGAN: What do you now hope will happen in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?
DR HANS BLIX: Well I can't say I hope they find something, if there is something I would wish them to find it but it's not that I'm longing to find it, I mean it's plausible that there is nothing so my hope would be that truth will come out, then we'll have something convincing.
COLGAN: And do you still believe that UN inspectors must go in at some stage to verify whatever it is the US finds?
DR HANS BLIX: Well if they find 200 tonnes of mustard gas and a big sample of various biological weapons and put it on the table then that could be unclean controvertible evidence, fine but if they find ambiguous things like the trucks that you now have or they're talking about the aluminium tubes etc, then I think that the credibility would be much greater if they had international expertise, not selected by them but selected by an impartial organisation.
COLGAN: Dr Blix, thanks for joining us.