The Nuclear Great Game
January 2004 – 52’00”
George Bush
President of the USA
“We face a brand of evil, the likes of which we haven’t seen in a long time in the world. These are people who strike and hide, people who know no borders, people who depend upon others. And make no mistake about it; the new war is not only against the evildoers themselves. The new war is against those who harbour them and finance them and feed them.”
James Kelly
Assistant Secretary of State, USA
“And we have to solve all of the nuclear problem, and the element of speed does not only apply to the plutonium issue. The enriched uranium issue, some have assumed, is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future. It is not, Mr Chairman; it is only probably a matter of months, and not years, behind the plutonium. So we really have to address this entire issue.”
Larry Scheinman
Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, California
“It appears that there was an exchange between Pakistan and North Korea, with respect to missile technology going one way, and nuclear information or technology, and I don’t know how much may have transferred, whether it was technology, blueprints, materials and equipment or what, but there seems to be a very strong belief that there was an exchange, a buyer arrangement if you will, between Pakistan and North Korea at some time in the past and probably not that many years ago.”
David Albright
President, Institute for Science and International Security, Washington DC
“There’s pretty strong evidence that Pakistan either officially or unofficially gave North Korea classified gas centrifuge information. They may also have provided ongoing technical assistance. Building a centrifuge is quite complicated and people developing centrifuges often have questions they need answered and it may be that Pakistani scientists played a role in answering questions as they came up. We also think that Pakistan may have been a source either of centrifuge components or of dual use equipment to make centrifuge components. So in general we think Pakistan was a major provider of the technology and perhaps some of the actual components of centrifuges and perhaps some dual use equipment to make centrifuge components.”
Larry Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC
“The first is: was this Pakistani – North Korean arrangement strictly a buyer arrangement, or did North Korea purchase and pay Pakistan for some of this technology, or for some of the materials and components? There is some evidence that North Korea did expend some substantial amounts of money and buy components and possibly technology from Pakistan as part of this arrangement.
The second issue, which is even more important, is first: has Pakistan’s own nuclear program progressed to the point where Pakistan can produce nuclear weapons in the form of nuclear warheads that can be mounted on missiles? And if Pakistan’s program has advanced into this stage, did Pakistan transfer this kind of technology to North Korea as part of the deal, so that North Korea could produce nuclear weapons in the form of warheads that it could mount on its intermediate-range and perhaps even long–range ballistic missiles? To me, in terms of the actual threat of actually both of these programs, that is a crucial question. I don’t know the answer to that question, I don’t know if our experts really have a definitive conclusion. With regard to North Korea I think the answer is clearly we don’t know whether the North Koreans have been able to produce nuclear warheads.”
Gaurav Kampani
Senior Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, California
“Well, it means that the Chinese allowed over-flight rights to the Pakistani C 130s and they were allowed to make refueling stops. Does that mean the Chinese government knew necessarily what was happening? Probably Chinese intelligence knew that missiles were being transferred. However, did the Chinese know that centrifuge designs or technology were being transferred? Did the Chinese know whether Pakistani scientists and engineers were transiting through China? I don’t know. This is very difficult to establish. Just because aircraft are transiting through a certain country does not mean that intelligence knows everything of a particular country, everything as to what’s going on. I am not persuaded that the Chinese knew everything that was happening.”
Bill Triplett
Author of ‘Red Dragon Rising’ and formerly Intelligence Analyst
“Well in the first place the North Koreans and the Pakistanis cannot run a cargo plane from each other’s capital without stopping to refuel in China. So that is the first indication. The second indication is that there are certain critical parts that are necessary for the North Korean long-range missile program that have to be made in China, we believe, and there are also critical parts for the enriched uranium program that have to be made in China. So we believe that the cargo planes were coming from Pakistan, they picked up some parts in China, went on to North Korea and then in reverse picked up other parts on their way back to Pakistan.”
1 (11) The Pakistani Air Force’s C 130s flying out of Islamabad would take this route over Tibet to Lanchou for refuelling and then they would follow the corridor straight through to Pyongyang. It is anybody’s guess whether a cargo got loaded at Lanchou. The possibility is always there, as Bill Triplett points out. The return journey would involve backtracking along the same route.
2 (12) How were these flights tracked? Part of the monitoring used to take place from the Indian Air Force’s radar and electronic signal gathering station at Patnitop, high in the Himalayas in Kashmir. All Pakistan Air Force radio and signal traffic, emanating from airfields like Islamabad and Kohat among others, is tracked from Patnitop. This provides the first line of intel on flights through to China. These are unusual flights for the Pakistanis, because their regular flights to China are essentially to Chengdu to pick up aircraft spares. This core intel was presumably shared by the Indians with the Americans, who then deployed more sophisticated means to track these flights.
R/T TX (transmission) BETWEEN PAKISTAN AIRCRAFT AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
ON GROUND AT PAKISTAN AIR BASE
AQ1 Red man control “this is AQ1, we are ready to start motors
ATC AQ1 you are clear to start
AQ1 Red Man AQ1 ready for taxi
ATC AQ1 “you are clear to taxi for runway 02
AQ1 Roger Red Man, runway 02
ATC AQ1 confirm ready to copy departure instructions
AQ1 Go ahead
ATC Red Man clears AQ1 to Charlie Golf, Lanchou, China via flight plant route. Switch to Northern radar after take off.
AQ1 Roger Red Man will contact Northern radar and now we are ready for departure over
ATC AQ1 you are clear to line up and take off at runway 02
AQ1 Roger Red Man clear for take-off runway 02
Even after monitoring these flights, US intelligence agencies were helpless bystanders, who watched silently as the Pakistan Air Force used US gifted C130s to conduct Pakistan’s deadly barter with North Korea, because Pakistan was an ally of the US in the war against terror. According to the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate, submitted to President Bush in June 2002, Pakistani-built uranium centrifuges, which are slim cylinders six feet high, were shipped by the thousands in the C130s to Pyongyang. The CIA Report estimated that with the few thousand centrifuges delivered by Pakistan to North Korea, over three warheads a year could be built, with enough fissile material left over to sell to other terrorist organizations like Al Qaida.
ATC Red man control. AQ1 is now changing over to Northern radar
AQ1 You are clear
AQ1 Northern radar this is AQ1. We are airborne under flight plan of Red Man control for Charlie Golf, climbing through flight level 100
N.R AQ1 this is Northern radar we have you with us, you are clear to your destination call on top of climb
AQ1 Roger
AQ1 Northern radar we are now at level 230 and in contact with route
N.R AQ1 you are clear to change over
AQ1 Charlie Golf, this is AQ1 how do you read?
CG (Chinese accent) AQ1 we read you strength 5. Report when ready to descend
AQ1 Roger Charlie Golf
AQ1 Charlie Golf, AQ1 is now ready to leave level 230
CG Roger AQ1 you are clear to one thousand feet on QNH 997
AQ1 Roger one thousand on QNH 997
AQ1 Charlie golf AQ1 is now approaching one thousand feet on QNH 997
CG Roger AQ1 you are clear to a straight line in VOR / ILS approach for runway 09
ATC Roger clear for VOR/ILS approach for runway 09
AQ1 Charlie Golf we have your runway in sight request
CG AQ1 you are clear to land runway 09
AQ1 Roger clear to land runway 09 AQ1
AQ1 Charlie Golf this is AQ1 we are now climbing through one thousand feet and ready to change over to Tango X- ray (Pyongyang)
CG AQ1 we are clear to change over route.
AQ1 Roger AQ1
AQ1 Tango X-Ray control, this is Q1, we are level 230 and ready for descent
TX AQ1 you are clear to descend to level 150 report reaching
AQ1 Roger AQ1
AQ1 TX control Charlie Golf is now level 150 requests further
This trade might have continued unimpeded had it not been for calculated leaks to the press from the US intelligence community, which was alarmed at the inertia of the State Department in not cracking down on Pakistan at the time when this trade could have been valuably disrupted. Today the Pakistanis stand exposed, though hardly censured.
TX AQ1 you are clear to one zero thousand feet on QNH 999 and change over to radar
AQ1 Roger clear to one zero thousand feet on QNH 999 and now changing over to radar
AQ1 TX radar this is AQ1
TX AQ1 this is TX radar we have you on over screen you are clear for a straight in VOR approach for runway 09
AQ1 Roger: clear VOR approach for runway 09
3 (14) Bill Triplett was unwilling to disclose who and how the US tracked these flights.
Bill Triplett:
“I am not permitted to tell you.”
The National Reconnaissance Office is a super secret US Government Agency that just got declassified in 1992. Till that time it never even existed. The NRO’s satellites tracked the Pakistani C 130s all the way from Islamabad to Pyongyang and back. This evidence was the equivalent of the Rosetta stone in convincing the US of this barter trade.
4 (18) This satellite photograph of Pyongyang airport is a commercial variant taken by an Indian spy satellite called the IKONOS and marketed commercially by Space Imaging, who very kindly provided this image. This photo of Pyongyang airport shows a C 130 parked next to two Russian IL 76 Jet transports that were sold to the North Koreans by the Russians. Interestingly, there is another IL 76 parked a little distance away. It is anybody’s guess if it belongs to the Chinese. The resolution of this picture does not permit a further close up to ascertain the aircraft markings. The establishment of that degree of conclusiveness is left to the NRO. Our experts confirmed that the aircraft circled in red and parked next to the two IL76s was a C130.
Larry Niksch
“China has had a very long and intimate relationship with North Korea. There are many things about North Korean policy that China does not like. But China has had a long-standing policy of supporting the North Korean state, to keep a buffer state like North Korea on its North-Eastern border, to prevent a collapse of North Korea that would lead to Korean unification with US troops still on Korean soil.”
5 (20) Bill Triplett, who co-authored the book “Red Dragon Rising” with Ed Timperlake, has identified the People’s Liberation Army’s Chief Spymaster, General Xiong Guangkai as the person in charge of the Peoples Republic of China’s dealings with North Korea on missiles and nuclear matters. A secret protocol was signed by the two countries in May 1996. In fact Gen Xiong Guangkai has a famous quote on this subject: ” the Chinese and North Koreans are in the relations of lips and teeth, and the peoples and armies of the two countries have a blood tied relationship.”
Bill Triplett:
“I think we can certainly say that the Chinese have made an effort to have what they call ‘clean hands’ – that is they go through surrogates so that they will not be blamed directly for things arriving. Now in some cases, for example in Pakistan with the shorter-range ballistic missiles, they exported those things directly to Pakistan as everyone knows: the so-called M11 and M9 programs. When you get into the longer- range missiles such as the ones the North Koreans have produced, again certain critical parts of these come from China, we believe.”
6 (22) The North Koreans have four types of operational land based ballistic missiles in active use. These are the Scud B, Scud C, Nodong and Taepo Dong 1. The last has a range of over 1000 miles. All four of these missiles have been provided to Pakistan.
7 (23) The North Korean and Chinese closeness goes back to the Korean War, when Chairman Mao lost his son fighting back the US advance up to the Yalu River, North Korea’s border with China. In fact, the Yalu River is out of bounds to foreign diplomats and it is speculated that Chinese missiles cross the Yalu by barge and then are loaded onto North Korean ships bounds for the Middle East.
Bill Triplett
“ General Xiong Guangkai, he is the deputy Chief of Staff for intelligence, but he has a much wider role than simply as an intelligence analyst. We think he is an operational person, for example he is the person who signed various defence agreements with Pakistan in the spring of 2002. The General is probably the case officer for this trade, because of the fact that he shows up at critical times in North Korea, he shows up at critical times in Pakistan.”
Gen. Xiong Guangkai
Vice Chief of the People’s Liberation Army, China
“Stick to the principle of gaining the initiative by striking second. That means we will never fire the first shots.”
Bill Triplett
“Well I think certainly there is a grand plan that China has had since at least the late 1940s, maybe 1950 onward, with regard to encircling India and I think if you start and look at their activities – taking over Tibet- their military technology and training in the neighbourhood of India, including interestingly enough right up the East coast of Africa, you will find lots of visits by military officers - they pay money and so forth and so on.”
Michael Wilds
Attorney
“It was in the presence of my client that it was decided that they would launch a pre-emptive military strike with New Delhi as their prime target, as well as other locations within India that would have nuclear imports, specifically places where they would store their nuclear weapons and equipment. On May 8th he departed Islamabad, he took a flight that stopped in Dubai and Frankfurt and arrived in Montreal on May 9th. He knows the yield of the weapons, he knows the Indian and the Pakistani, the distinctions in the weapon grades which the Americans try and mediate.”
Chaudhary Iftikhar Khan
Pakistan Nuclear Scientist
“At that meeting it was decided that Pakistan should attack India by using nuclear weapons.”
Interviewer
“Did you make that decision?”
Chaudhary Iftikhar Khan
“No: the Chief of the army staff, and all the other attendees of that meeting supported him. The Chinese helped Pakistan to make nuclear weapons and the atomic bomb. They supplied to Pakistan skilled labour – skilled professionals - and they supplied the material that is to be used for an atomic bomb.”
Dr Jacobus Collyn
Intelligence Analyst, Holland
“We also know that in all probability Pakistan received great help from China in mastering the weaponisation of the nuclear device, indeed may have obtained a copy of the 1966 model of the Chinese bomb.”
8 (28) These shots show the mine-shaft and the hill in the Chagai Area of Baluchistan, near the Afghan border where the Pakistani nuclear device was detonated in May 1998 right after the Indian tests. After conducting the Pakistan Nuclear Test, the Pakistani team of scientists returned to delirious crowds at Islamabad airport.
Sammar Mubarak
Supervisor of Pakistan Nuclear Test
“This test has directly taken us to the weaponisation stage.”
Mushahid Hussain
Former Information Minister of Pakistan
“The nuclear explosions of Pakistan of 20th May and 30th May have helped to establish military and political parity between Pakistan and India. And I feel this is again a major development which has qualitatively altered the life and destiny of the 1.2billion people of South Asia.”
David Albright
“The fact that there were North Koreans at the Pakistani test site came from reports from embassies in Islamabad, a European embassy, and so is it true or not? I mean I don’t know but it came out of an embassy from Pakistan and it was a report back to its capital, and so it was believed by the government people.”
9 (30) Kim Sin-ae, wife of the Economics Counsellor at the North Korean embassy in Islamabad, Kang Thae-yun, was murdered on 9th June 1998, just days after the Pakistani nuclear test, as reported in The Sunday Telegraph in its issue dated November 1 1998 in a story filed by Julian West. Kim was murdered because she was suspected of providing details of the North Korean-Pakistani barter to British Intelligence……….
“So do you have the film?”
“Yes, here it is.”
“The arrangements are almost complete. I’ll be in touch.
“Okay”
“Bye.”
10 (31) …….Kim and her husband Kang both closely worked with leading figures of the Pakistani nuclear establishment. Though under Diplomatic cover, Kang actually worked for Changgwang Sinyong Corp that manages North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure………
...Kim’s death was largely ignored until Japanese intelligence confirmed that a prototype centrifuge was smuggled with her coffin on a special flight and the CIA later obtained details. Kang left Islamabad soon after murdering his wife. The State Department imposed sanctions on both the Changgwang Sinyong Corp and Dr A.Q. Khan Research Labs for their role in the barter.
10(b) The Pakistan-North Korea barter was initially conducted by sea, through innocuous cargo vessels that regularly plied between the two countries, with fake manifests concealing their actual cargos. In the initial years, intelligence on this undercover trade was limited and no one in the Clinton Administration was willing to believe the scraps of intelligence that were periodically thrown up. 9/11 changed the US perception of traditionally turning a blind eye to Pakistani indiscretions.
Here you see the Indian navy conducting an exercise to intercept a Korean ship in the Arabian Sea, allegedly carrying ballistic missiles for Pakistan.
TRANSCRIPTS OF NAVAL COMMANDERS BRIEFING TO AIRCREW
VO1:
Good afternoon gentlemen
VO2:
The briefing for this sortie is the interception of a Korean ship carrying weapons of mass destruction. The situation on hand gentlemen is a that the Korean ship set sail from Al Qadr. The ship is masquerading as MV Cosmos carrying critical components of weapons of mass destruction for an unfriendly neighborhood. Byte 2 (close lip synch needed)
VO3:
The vessel has departed from port on 25th at 0400 hrs under the cover of darkness. We also know that the last known position of the vessel is something close to around 300 nautical miles heading northwest and is positioned south west of Dabolim. The mission, gentlemen, on hand is to locate and shadow MV Cosmos and thereafter shepherd our own surface forces for interception and boarding.
VO4:
Gentlemen, MV Cosmos looks something like this: it has got four derricks in the forward part of the ship, the deck is painted grey in colour ship side black and red combination, one funnel in the aft, and a super structure in the aft.
VO 5:
The tactical situation gentlemen are that there are multinational forces expected to be operating in the area, USS Saratoga and the USS Enterprise with British Naval ship. Sir Galahad and a couple of amphibious ships as well. PC 3s Orions are expected to be flying from Diego Garcia along with integral Chinooks from the amphibious ships. Weather in the morning is expected to be pre-synoptic monsoon condition with haze developing in the afternoon and strong pressure bearing winds expected because of which you will have winds gusting up to 20 knots in the evening hours, towering cumulus and CB activity during afternoon and clouding is expected in the evening hours in your area of operation. The code word is Curie.
VO 6:
Bye Gentlemen. Happy hunting.
TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND CONTROL TOWER
A/C: Control this is blue dragon, motors running.
ATC: Blue dragon you are cleared for Taxi.
A/C: Roger Control. Taxiing runaway 01
ATC: Blue Dragon confirm ready to copy departure instructions
A/C: Go ahead
ATC: Control clears Blue Dragon to flight plan Curie
A/C: Roger and over
ATC: You are cleared for take off.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN PILOTS IN THE AIRCRAFT
Pilot 1: Turn right by 10 degrees
Pilot 2: Roger
Pilot 1:Descend to 200 meters
Pilot 2: Descending by 200 meters sir
Pilot 1: Target right ahead within sight
Pilot 2: Contact visual ahead sir
Pilot 1: Descending down by 200 meters for visual contact
Pilot 2: All throttles 40
Pilot 1: All throttles 40 Roger
Pilot 2: Contact right ahead seems to be a large merchant vessel of about 200 meters with red and black colours and derricks and has a funnel on the aft section. Flight master can you please see if you can read the name on the side of the ship?
Pilot 1: Roger
Pilot 2: Range 9 km to target
Pilot 1: Roger
Pilot 2: Range 9 km to target
Pilot 1: Roger
Pilot 2: Roger contact confirm Cosmos
Pilot 1: Maintaining 200 meters over flying contact, stand by for overheads
Pilot 1: Roger standing by
Pilot 1: Overhead. Now, now, now.
10(c) Through the nineties, and particularly after signing the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994, which prohibited it from developing nuclear weapons via the plutonium enrichment route, the Clinton Administration behaved like an ostrich and didn’t want to know about this barter which was going to have serious strategic implications for the US in the future. After 9/11, the US began to put together all the pieces of this Chinese jigsaw. As far as the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are concerned, the US delegated the security of this region to the Indian navy, which now escorts US merchantmen through the Indian Ocean and also interdicts suspicious merchant ships. But the trade goes on and so does the triangular relationship between the Chinese, Pakistanis and North Koreans.
DIALOGUE IN COAST GUARD VESSEL BETWEEN CAPTAIN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Capt: Very Good OW mark the position
Officer: Aye Sir
Capt: After course to 320 with Maximum speed to intercept
Officer: Assume damage control stage condition. Assume damage control and all position report to bridge
Officer: Vessel at 150 degrees
Capt: Moving course 140. Speed 15 knots
CONVERSATION BETWEEN KOREAN SHIP AND THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Officer: This is coast guard vessel calling. Coming please.
Cosmos: Good evening sir. Give me channel please
Officer: This is coast guard 344, which ship where bound
Cosmos: MV Cosmos sir bound for Djibouti
Officer: Name of the master and his nationality
Cosmos: Master’s name Kim Sian belonging to Korea sir
Officer: Length of vessel and nature of cargo carried
Cosmos: 189.8 meters sir and going Ballast
Officer: Thank you Motor Vessel Cosmos. I have a reason to believe that you are not on Ballast as your load lie is pretty low. Request after coast to 140 and proceed to anchorage of Marmagoa
Cosmos: Cannot do sir because I am behind the schedule sir
Officer: Negative, Negative. Comply to our orders or else I will be compelled to engage. Compelled to engage.
Cosmos: No, no sir. No engage sir. Proceeding as ordered sir
CONVERSATION BETWEEN CAPTAIN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Officer: Roger this is 34. I am following you.
Officer: Hands to action stations. Assume damage control stage 1 position 0. All persons report to bridge.
Capt.: Establish channel to aircraft and alter coast to intercept the vessel.
Officer: Staff at 10 next coast 320
Capt.: Very good. After coast 320 and proceed to investigate the vessel. Close up. Action stations.
Officer: Aye Sir
Capt.: Hands to action stations. Hands to action stations. Assume damage control stage 1. Position 0. All persons report to bridge.
Commodore Ranjit Rai
Former Indian Naval Officer
“I am Commodore Ranjit Rai, formerly of the Indian Navy. I am on board CGS Vijaya, a coastguard ship pennant no. CGS 34 and we just got back from a sortie from the Arabian Sea. You have just seen a simulated exercise of the coastguard intercepting a North Korean vessel carrying missile componentry for Pakistan. It was in July 99 that a similar ship of the name Ku Wol San was seized and the missile componentry bound and meant for Pakistan was confiscated.”
11 (35) The Ku Wol San began its journey from Nampo Port sometime in May 1999, first unloading a cargo at Bangkok and then carrying a cargo of sugar to Kandla Port from Bangkok. Its ultimate destination listed on the manifest was Malta. Enquiries revealed that the Maltese address was fake and the unlisted cargo of active missile components and personal items for North Korean scientists that was discovered on the basis of an intelligence tip off was actually meant for Karachi, Pakistan. The ship’s manifest was doctored to modify the truth and conceal the nature of the hidden cargo carried by it.
12 (36) While the Ku Wol San’s crew tried to prevent Indian Customs Officers from boarding the ship, North Korean officials descended upon the port to unsuccessfully secure release of her cargo consisting of 170 tons of metal casings, missile components, 22 technical instruction manuals in Korean language, personal mail addressed to Korean scientists in Pakistan and large hampers of Korean processed food. The seized manuals gave both Indian and US intelligence officers their first insight into Pyongyang’s missile prowess.
Commodore Ranjit Rai
“More recently, in December 2002 in the Arabian Sea the Spanish navy intercepted a shipment of North Korean scud missiles, and they were bound for Yemen.”
13 (38) US spy satellites and ships had been tracking an unidentified ship in the Arabian Sea. The ship named Sosan was unflagged and improperly registered. Though it refused to stop when asked to do so, it did not resist the armed takeover by the Spanish Navy. The Spaniards discovered 15 Scuds under 40,000 bags of cement. The cargo of Scuds was claimed by the Yemenis.
Ari Fleischer
White House Press Spokesman
“We have looked at this matter thoroughly. There is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea. While there is authority to stop and search, in this instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen, and therefore the merchant vessel is being released. Yemen has given the United States assurances that it will not transfer these missiles to anyone.”
Larry Niksch
“I think the testing back in 1998 of the Pakistani - I think that the Guari missile clearly was in effect a proxy test for the North Korean Nodong because all of the US assessments are that that missile was based on Nodong technology. So I think the Pakistanis have been able to benefit in supplying this technology to countries like Iran and Pakistan, in that the testing of such missiles by these two countries also provides information to the North Koreans about the reliability of their missiles and their technology.”
14 (42) Built and conceived entirely with Chinese assistance and close supervision, this heavy water reactor at Khushab is the central element of Pakistan’s program for production of plutonium and tritium for advanced compact warheads. The Khushab facility like the uranium enrichment one at Kahuta is not subject to IAEA controls and safeguards. This reactor is run by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, as opposed to the Dr. A.Q. Khan Research Lab that runs the Kahuta Facility.
15(43)The Kahuta facility was built by the infamous Dr Abdul Qadir Khan and is based on using gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium to make nuclear weapons as opposed to reprocessing plutonium. Dr Khan, who in the early 1970s worked for a Dutch research laboratory called FDO, stole this technology from URENCO, a tri-nation British, Dutch and German consortium, which was using FDO as a sub contractor. China also contributed in enabling the Kahuta complex to obtain operational capability in producing weapons grade U-235.
16 (44) After completing the theft of technology and classified information and establishing a vast supply chain from Holland and Germany, Khan fled to Pakistan where, with the Government’s funding, he set up the Dr A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories and started to build the Pakistani Bomb. Khan was convicted by a Dutch court for espionage and sentenced to a three-year prison term in absentia. In later years the Khan research laboratories also started assembling North Korean missiles, thus making the laboratory a comprehensive nuclear weapons establishment.
Dr Jacobus Collyn
“In 1975 he left Holland for a holiday, but he never returned. And he was in Pakistan almost immediately called upon to lead the Pakistani project in Kahuta. After the Indian test in 1974 Pakistan of course had decided to enter upon its own nuclear program. Now in his booklet ’20 Years of Excellence’, which he wrote in 1996, he describes how much effort was needed to collect and assemble the thousands of parts and components the Pakistani industry was not able to produce itself. And he literally underscores the usefulness of his network of former European friends and relations.”
Dr Fritz Veerman speaks (subtitled)
Dutch Nuclear Scientist
17 (47) Pakistan successfully established a network of front companies to purchase and ship dual use equipment from a network of European suppliers for its nuclear programme based on uranium enrichment. This network created under the guidance of Dr. A.Q. Khan was invaluable as it had a catalogue of almost 4000 suppliers. This qualitative information passed on to North Korea will definitely have played the role of a multiplier in enabling Pyongyang to leap frog almost 10-15 years in its ability to weaponise a nuclear device made from enriched uranium based on the URENCO centrifuge technology.
The German hand in Pakistan’s nuclear program has been significant.
In August 1993, Customs Inspectors in Bonn intercepted a Pakistan bound shipment described in the bill of lading as ballpoint pen refills. On examination, it was found that these were high tech precision parts employed in centrifuges for production of weapons grade aluminum and have no other use.
The German companies involved in this trade belonged to this man Alfred Migue who was sentenced to six months imprisonment for having supplied a complete uranium reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Other material was also supplied by him.
18 (49) According to intelligence reports and the testimony of a Korean-Japanese defector from North Korea’s nuclear program, Mr. Kenki Aoyama, the Yongbyon nuclear plant is actually a gigantic nuclear complex, which has plants for both reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium. All these plants are underground, fed by a network of tunnels. The purpose of the complex is to produce nuclear bombs. Intelligence sources feel that Yongbyon has received substantial inputs from Pakistan’s Dr. A.Q. Khan’s laboratories, at least as far as the uranium enrichment plant is concerned.
19 (50) As a signal of its resolve to exercise a military option as the tensions mounted in the North Korean Peninsula last March, the US began to deploy 24 B52 bombers on the island of Guam from their home base at Barksdale, Louisiana. Amongst likely targets for these B52s and other B1 bombers stationed at Guam, Yongbyon stands out as one of the prime targets to be “taken out”, in the event of a military option being exercised.
Major Estrada
B52 Pilot
“Well what you see is what you get. If you want to know what we’ll be doing if we get involved in a war, just look at our history, look at our past conflicts and it will be very similar to that.”
20 (51) The emergence of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal or MMA in Pakistan as a strong political force after the October 10,2002 elections, is a matter of serious concern because of its perception of the US and India as the enemies of Islam and the MMA’s belief in the “clash of civilisations” paradigm and the value of “jehad” for all Muslims. Here, most of the leading lights of the MMA are seen voicing their hatred of the US particularly in its intervention in Afghanistan. Of them, Masood Azhar was released by India in exchange for a hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft and passengers.
21 (53) The man who built this un-safeguarded Khushab reactor, Mr. Sultan Bashir-ud-din Mahmood, relied extensively on illicitly procuring all equipment from abroad, apart from what was provided by the Chinese. Mr. Mahmood had also worked on the uranium enrichment program of Dr. A.Q. Khan. However, because of Mahmood’s involvement with Al-Qaida and Osama Bin Laden, after 9/11 he was placed on the FBI’s most wanted list and President Musharraf placed the lid on this can of worms by putting Mahmood under house arrest and preventing US intelligence from extracting the truth. According to the December 12 2001 Washington post, Mahmood admitted that he had long discussions with Al Qaida officials in August 2001 about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
David Albright
“ No, the threat I think was very great, that if Al Qaida had stayed in Afghanistan and had had help from Pakistani scientists – they worked with the cover of the Taliban so they can import things, to use things illegally - there is a great risk that Al Qaida would move to developing a nuclear weapon. They would have to acquire the high-enriched uranium, the plutonium overseas, but they would have an indigenous capability, can we call it a quasi state program.
What we don’t know is how much classified information did Mahmood and Majid actually (and others, it wasn’t just them ) - how much information did they collectively give Al Qaida that could turn out to be useful in building a nuclear weapon later, once they can re-establish themselves or just re-establish themselves someplace else? Al Qaida could make a dirty bomb any time it wants. It could have radioactive material – it’s so plentiful and so easy to obtain. And the scientists may or may not have discussed that. My understanding is, from the reporting, that they did discuss that with Bin Laden.”
22 (55) Even if the threat posed by the Chinese brokered, Pakistan-North Korean barter trade in nuclear capable ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads developed from enriched uranium is controlled, the export of missile production equipment and the establishment of production facilities in Syria, Iran and Pakistan have already occurred. Furthermore, the testing and refinement of North Korea’s Nodong and Taepodong ballistic missiles by Pakistan has already taken place and the results and conclusions shared with North Korea. Finally, the transfer of know how, equipment and materials to develop nuclear warheads through the enriched uranium route have also been transferred by Pakistan to North Korea. Proliferation is now complete and both Pakistan and North Korea are nuclear weaponised states with ballistic missile capabilities of varying range. It is puerile to believe that, after all this, backroom exchanges between the two have ceased forever. The effect of these exchanges shall extend well into the future.
23 (56) As dusk settles in Washington on a glorious summer’s day in 2003, the mood on the surface is upbeat. 9/11 is a bad dream. However, the surface calm in no way reveals the gathering anxieties of the times to come. The reluctant US ally in the war against terrorism, Pakistan, has, with a lot of help from China, wilfully enabled North Korea to become the third nation after Russia and China to train its nuclear missiles on the US. This is a reality that the US is going to find hard to live with, as it is unlikely that North Korea will ever disarm its nuclear forces. However, having tasted blood, will Pakistan be the fourth nation in line after North Korea to target US interests with nuclear weapons?
January 2004 – 52’00”
George Bush
President of the USA
“We face a brand of evil, the likes of which we haven’t seen in a long time in the world. These are people who strike and hide, people who know no borders, people who depend upon others. And make no mistake about it; the new war is not only against the evildoers themselves. The new war is against those who harbour them and finance them and feed them.”
James Kelly
Assistant Secretary of State, USA
“And we have to solve all of the nuclear problem, and the element of speed does not only apply to the plutonium issue. The enriched uranium issue, some have assumed, is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future. It is not, Mr Chairman; it is only probably a matter of months, and not years, behind the plutonium. So we really have to address this entire issue.”
Larry Scheinman
Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, California
“It appears that there was an exchange between Pakistan and North Korea, with respect to missile technology going one way, and nuclear information or technology, and I don’t know how much may have transferred, whether it was technology, blueprints, materials and equipment or what, but there seems to be a very strong belief that there was an exchange, a buyer arrangement if you will, between Pakistan and North Korea at some time in the past and probably not that many years ago.”
David Albright
President, Institute for Science and International Security, Washington DC
“There’s pretty strong evidence that Pakistan either officially or unofficially gave North Korea classified gas centrifuge information. They may also have provided ongoing technical assistance. Building a centrifuge is quite complicated and people developing centrifuges often have questions they need answered and it may be that Pakistani scientists played a role in answering questions as they came up. We also think that Pakistan may have been a source either of centrifuge components or of dual use equipment to make centrifuge components. So in general we think Pakistan was a major provider of the technology and perhaps some of the actual components of centrifuges and perhaps some dual use equipment to make centrifuge components.”
Larry Niksch
Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC
“The first is: was this Pakistani – North Korean arrangement strictly a buyer arrangement, or did North Korea purchase and pay Pakistan for some of this technology, or for some of the materials and components? There is some evidence that North Korea did expend some substantial amounts of money and buy components and possibly technology from Pakistan as part of this arrangement.
The second issue, which is even more important, is first: has Pakistan’s own nuclear program progressed to the point where Pakistan can produce nuclear weapons in the form of nuclear warheads that can be mounted on missiles? And if Pakistan’s program has advanced into this stage, did Pakistan transfer this kind of technology to North Korea as part of the deal, so that North Korea could produce nuclear weapons in the form of warheads that it could mount on its intermediate-range and perhaps even long–range ballistic missiles? To me, in terms of the actual threat of actually both of these programs, that is a crucial question. I don’t know the answer to that question, I don’t know if our experts really have a definitive conclusion. With regard to North Korea I think the answer is clearly we don’t know whether the North Koreans have been able to produce nuclear warheads.”
Gaurav Kampani
Senior Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, California
“Well, it means that the Chinese allowed over-flight rights to the Pakistani C 130s and they were allowed to make refueling stops. Does that mean the Chinese government knew necessarily what was happening? Probably Chinese intelligence knew that missiles were being transferred. However, did the Chinese know that centrifuge designs or technology were being transferred? Did the Chinese know whether Pakistani scientists and engineers were transiting through China? I don’t know. This is very difficult to establish. Just because aircraft are transiting through a certain country does not mean that intelligence knows everything of a particular country, everything as to what’s going on. I am not persuaded that the Chinese knew everything that was happening.”
Bill Triplett
Author of ‘Red Dragon Rising’ and formerly Intelligence Analyst
“Well in the first place the North Koreans and the Pakistanis cannot run a cargo plane from each other’s capital without stopping to refuel in China. So that is the first indication. The second indication is that there are certain critical parts that are necessary for the North Korean long-range missile program that have to be made in China, we believe, and there are also critical parts for the enriched uranium program that have to be made in China. So we believe that the cargo planes were coming from Pakistan, they picked up some parts in China, went on to North Korea and then in reverse picked up other parts on their way back to Pakistan.”
1 (11) The Pakistani Air Force’s C 130s flying out of Islamabad would take this route over Tibet to Lanchou for refuelling and then they would follow the corridor straight through to Pyongyang. It is anybody’s guess whether a cargo got loaded at Lanchou. The possibility is always there, as Bill Triplett points out. The return journey would involve backtracking along the same route.
2 (12) How were these flights tracked? Part of the monitoring used to take place from the Indian Air Force’s radar and electronic signal gathering station at Patnitop, high in the Himalayas in Kashmir. All Pakistan Air Force radio and signal traffic, emanating from airfields like Islamabad and Kohat among others, is tracked from Patnitop. This provides the first line of intel on flights through to China. These are unusual flights for the Pakistanis, because their regular flights to China are essentially to Chengdu to pick up aircraft spares. This core intel was presumably shared by the Indians with the Americans, who then deployed more sophisticated means to track these flights.
R/T TX (transmission) BETWEEN PAKISTAN AIRCRAFT AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
ON GROUND AT PAKISTAN AIR BASE
AQ1 Red man control “this is AQ1, we are ready to start motors
ATC AQ1 you are clear to start
AQ1 Red Man AQ1 ready for taxi
ATC AQ1 “you are clear to taxi for runway 02
AQ1 Roger Red Man, runway 02
ATC AQ1 confirm ready to copy departure instructions
AQ1 Go ahead
ATC Red Man clears AQ1 to Charlie Golf, Lanchou, China via flight plant route. Switch to Northern radar after take off.
AQ1 Roger Red Man will contact Northern radar and now we are ready for departure over
ATC AQ1 you are clear to line up and take off at runway 02
AQ1 Roger Red Man clear for take-off runway 02
Even after monitoring these flights, US intelligence agencies were helpless bystanders, who watched silently as the Pakistan Air Force used US gifted C130s to conduct Pakistan’s deadly barter with North Korea, because Pakistan was an ally of the US in the war against terror. According to the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate, submitted to President Bush in June 2002, Pakistani-built uranium centrifuges, which are slim cylinders six feet high, were shipped by the thousands in the C130s to Pyongyang. The CIA Report estimated that with the few thousand centrifuges delivered by Pakistan to North Korea, over three warheads a year could be built, with enough fissile material left over to sell to other terrorist organizations like Al Qaida.
ATC Red man control. AQ1 is now changing over to Northern radar
AQ1 You are clear
AQ1 Northern radar this is AQ1. We are airborne under flight plan of Red Man control for Charlie Golf, climbing through flight level 100
N.R AQ1 this is Northern radar we have you with us, you are clear to your destination call on top of climb
AQ1 Roger
AQ1 Northern radar we are now at level 230 and in contact with route
N.R AQ1 you are clear to change over
AQ1 Charlie Golf, this is AQ1 how do you read?
CG (Chinese accent) AQ1 we read you strength 5. Report when ready to descend
AQ1 Roger Charlie Golf
AQ1 Charlie Golf, AQ1 is now ready to leave level 230
CG Roger AQ1 you are clear to one thousand feet on QNH 997
AQ1 Roger one thousand on QNH 997
AQ1 Charlie golf AQ1 is now approaching one thousand feet on QNH 997
CG Roger AQ1 you are clear to a straight line in VOR / ILS approach for runway 09
ATC Roger clear for VOR/ILS approach for runway 09
AQ1 Charlie Golf we have your runway in sight request
CG AQ1 you are clear to land runway 09
AQ1 Roger clear to land runway 09 AQ1
AQ1 Charlie Golf this is AQ1 we are now climbing through one thousand feet and ready to change over to Tango X- ray (Pyongyang)
CG AQ1 we are clear to change over route.
AQ1 Roger AQ1
AQ1 Tango X-Ray control, this is Q1, we are level 230 and ready for descent
TX AQ1 you are clear to descend to level 150 report reaching
AQ1 Roger AQ1
AQ1 TX control Charlie Golf is now level 150 requests further
This trade might have continued unimpeded had it not been for calculated leaks to the press from the US intelligence community, which was alarmed at the inertia of the State Department in not cracking down on Pakistan at the time when this trade could have been valuably disrupted. Today the Pakistanis stand exposed, though hardly censured.
TX AQ1 you are clear to one zero thousand feet on QNH 999 and change over to radar
AQ1 Roger clear to one zero thousand feet on QNH 999 and now changing over to radar
AQ1 TX radar this is AQ1
TX AQ1 this is TX radar we have you on over screen you are clear for a straight in VOR approach for runway 09
AQ1 Roger: clear VOR approach for runway 09
3 (14) Bill Triplett was unwilling to disclose who and how the US tracked these flights.
Bill Triplett:
“I am not permitted to tell you.”
The National Reconnaissance Office is a super secret US Government Agency that just got declassified in 1992. Till that time it never even existed. The NRO’s satellites tracked the Pakistani C 130s all the way from Islamabad to Pyongyang and back. This evidence was the equivalent of the Rosetta stone in convincing the US of this barter trade.
4 (18) This satellite photograph of Pyongyang airport is a commercial variant taken by an Indian spy satellite called the IKONOS and marketed commercially by Space Imaging, who very kindly provided this image. This photo of Pyongyang airport shows a C 130 parked next to two Russian IL 76 Jet transports that were sold to the North Koreans by the Russians. Interestingly, there is another IL 76 parked a little distance away. It is anybody’s guess if it belongs to the Chinese. The resolution of this picture does not permit a further close up to ascertain the aircraft markings. The establishment of that degree of conclusiveness is left to the NRO. Our experts confirmed that the aircraft circled in red and parked next to the two IL76s was a C130.
Larry Niksch
“China has had a very long and intimate relationship with North Korea. There are many things about North Korean policy that China does not like. But China has had a long-standing policy of supporting the North Korean state, to keep a buffer state like North Korea on its North-Eastern border, to prevent a collapse of North Korea that would lead to Korean unification with US troops still on Korean soil.”
5 (20) Bill Triplett, who co-authored the book “Red Dragon Rising” with Ed Timperlake, has identified the People’s Liberation Army’s Chief Spymaster, General Xiong Guangkai as the person in charge of the Peoples Republic of China’s dealings with North Korea on missiles and nuclear matters. A secret protocol was signed by the two countries in May 1996. In fact Gen Xiong Guangkai has a famous quote on this subject: ” the Chinese and North Koreans are in the relations of lips and teeth, and the peoples and armies of the two countries have a blood tied relationship.”
Bill Triplett:
“I think we can certainly say that the Chinese have made an effort to have what they call ‘clean hands’ – that is they go through surrogates so that they will not be blamed directly for things arriving. Now in some cases, for example in Pakistan with the shorter-range ballistic missiles, they exported those things directly to Pakistan as everyone knows: the so-called M11 and M9 programs. When you get into the longer- range missiles such as the ones the North Koreans have produced, again certain critical parts of these come from China, we believe.”
6 (22) The North Koreans have four types of operational land based ballistic missiles in active use. These are the Scud B, Scud C, Nodong and Taepo Dong 1. The last has a range of over 1000 miles. All four of these missiles have been provided to Pakistan.
7 (23) The North Korean and Chinese closeness goes back to the Korean War, when Chairman Mao lost his son fighting back the US advance up to the Yalu River, North Korea’s border with China. In fact, the Yalu River is out of bounds to foreign diplomats and it is speculated that Chinese missiles cross the Yalu by barge and then are loaded onto North Korean ships bounds for the Middle East.
Bill Triplett
“ General Xiong Guangkai, he is the deputy Chief of Staff for intelligence, but he has a much wider role than simply as an intelligence analyst. We think he is an operational person, for example he is the person who signed various defence agreements with Pakistan in the spring of 2002. The General is probably the case officer for this trade, because of the fact that he shows up at critical times in North Korea, he shows up at critical times in Pakistan.”
Gen. Xiong Guangkai
Vice Chief of the People’s Liberation Army, China
“Stick to the principle of gaining the initiative by striking second. That means we will never fire the first shots.”
Bill Triplett
“Well I think certainly there is a grand plan that China has had since at least the late 1940s, maybe 1950 onward, with regard to encircling India and I think if you start and look at their activities – taking over Tibet- their military technology and training in the neighbourhood of India, including interestingly enough right up the East coast of Africa, you will find lots of visits by military officers - they pay money and so forth and so on.”
Michael Wilds
Attorney
“It was in the presence of my client that it was decided that they would launch a pre-emptive military strike with New Delhi as their prime target, as well as other locations within India that would have nuclear imports, specifically places where they would store their nuclear weapons and equipment. On May 8th he departed Islamabad, he took a flight that stopped in Dubai and Frankfurt and arrived in Montreal on May 9th. He knows the yield of the weapons, he knows the Indian and the Pakistani, the distinctions in the weapon grades which the Americans try and mediate.”
Chaudhary Iftikhar Khan
Pakistan Nuclear Scientist
“At that meeting it was decided that Pakistan should attack India by using nuclear weapons.”
Interviewer
“Did you make that decision?”
Chaudhary Iftikhar Khan
“No: the Chief of the army staff, and all the other attendees of that meeting supported him. The Chinese helped Pakistan to make nuclear weapons and the atomic bomb. They supplied to Pakistan skilled labour – skilled professionals - and they supplied the material that is to be used for an atomic bomb.”
Dr Jacobus Collyn
Intelligence Analyst, Holland
“We also know that in all probability Pakistan received great help from China in mastering the weaponisation of the nuclear device, indeed may have obtained a copy of the 1966 model of the Chinese bomb.”
8 (28) These shots show the mine-shaft and the hill in the Chagai Area of Baluchistan, near the Afghan border where the Pakistani nuclear device was detonated in May 1998 right after the Indian tests. After conducting the Pakistan Nuclear Test, the Pakistani team of scientists returned to delirious crowds at Islamabad airport.
Sammar Mubarak
Supervisor of Pakistan Nuclear Test
“This test has directly taken us to the weaponisation stage.”
Mushahid Hussain
Former Information Minister of Pakistan
“The nuclear explosions of Pakistan of 20th May and 30th May have helped to establish military and political parity between Pakistan and India. And I feel this is again a major development which has qualitatively altered the life and destiny of the 1.2billion people of South Asia.”
David Albright
“The fact that there were North Koreans at the Pakistani test site came from reports from embassies in Islamabad, a European embassy, and so is it true or not? I mean I don’t know but it came out of an embassy from Pakistan and it was a report back to its capital, and so it was believed by the government people.”
9 (30) Kim Sin-ae, wife of the Economics Counsellor at the North Korean embassy in Islamabad, Kang Thae-yun, was murdered on 9th June 1998, just days after the Pakistani nuclear test, as reported in The Sunday Telegraph in its issue dated November 1 1998 in a story filed by Julian West. Kim was murdered because she was suspected of providing details of the North Korean-Pakistani barter to British Intelligence……….
“So do you have the film?”
“Yes, here it is.”
“The arrangements are almost complete. I’ll be in touch.
“Okay”
“Bye.”
10 (31) …….Kim and her husband Kang both closely worked with leading figures of the Pakistani nuclear establishment. Though under Diplomatic cover, Kang actually worked for Changgwang Sinyong Corp that manages North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure………
...Kim’s death was largely ignored until Japanese intelligence confirmed that a prototype centrifuge was smuggled with her coffin on a special flight and the CIA later obtained details. Kang left Islamabad soon after murdering his wife. The State Department imposed sanctions on both the Changgwang Sinyong Corp and Dr A.Q. Khan Research Labs for their role in the barter.
10(b) The Pakistan-North Korea barter was initially conducted by sea, through innocuous cargo vessels that regularly plied between the two countries, with fake manifests concealing their actual cargos. In the initial years, intelligence on this undercover trade was limited and no one in the Clinton Administration was willing to believe the scraps of intelligence that were periodically thrown up. 9/11 changed the US perception of traditionally turning a blind eye to Pakistani indiscretions.
Here you see the Indian navy conducting an exercise to intercept a Korean ship in the Arabian Sea, allegedly carrying ballistic missiles for Pakistan.
TRANSCRIPTS OF NAVAL COMMANDERS BRIEFING TO AIRCREW
VO1:
Good afternoon gentlemen
VO2:
The briefing for this sortie is the interception of a Korean ship carrying weapons of mass destruction. The situation on hand gentlemen is a that the Korean ship set sail from Al Qadr. The ship is masquerading as MV Cosmos carrying critical components of weapons of mass destruction for an unfriendly neighborhood. Byte 2 (close lip synch needed)
VO3:
The vessel has departed from port on 25th at 0400 hrs under the cover of darkness. We also know that the last known position of the vessel is something close to around 300 nautical miles heading northwest and is positioned south west of Dabolim. The mission, gentlemen, on hand is to locate and shadow MV Cosmos and thereafter shepherd our own surface forces for interception and boarding.
VO4:
Gentlemen, MV Cosmos looks something like this: it has got four derricks in the forward part of the ship, the deck is painted grey in colour ship side black and red combination, one funnel in the aft, and a super structure in the aft.
VO 5:
The tactical situation gentlemen are that there are multinational forces expected to be operating in the area, USS Saratoga and the USS Enterprise with British Naval ship. Sir Galahad and a couple of amphibious ships as well. PC 3s Orions are expected to be flying from Diego Garcia along with integral Chinooks from the amphibious ships. Weather in the morning is expected to be pre-synoptic monsoon condition with haze developing in the afternoon and strong pressure bearing winds expected because of which you will have winds gusting up to 20 knots in the evening hours, towering cumulus and CB activity during afternoon and clouding is expected in the evening hours in your area of operation. The code word is Curie.
VO 6:
Bye Gentlemen. Happy hunting.
TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND CONTROL TOWER
A/C: Control this is blue dragon, motors running.
ATC: Blue dragon you are cleared for Taxi.
A/C: Roger Control. Taxiing runaway 01
ATC: Blue Dragon confirm ready to copy departure instructions
A/C: Go ahead
ATC: Control clears Blue Dragon to flight plan Curie
A/C: Roger and over
ATC: You are cleared for take off.
CONVERSATION BETWEEN PILOTS IN THE AIRCRAFT
Pilot 1: Turn right by 10 degrees
Pilot 2: Roger
Pilot 1:Descend to 200 meters
Pilot 2: Descending by 200 meters sir
Pilot 1: Target right ahead within sight
Pilot 2: Contact visual ahead sir
Pilot 1: Descending down by 200 meters for visual contact
Pilot 2: All throttles 40
Pilot 1: All throttles 40 Roger
Pilot 2: Contact right ahead seems to be a large merchant vessel of about 200 meters with red and black colours and derricks and has a funnel on the aft section. Flight master can you please see if you can read the name on the side of the ship?
Pilot 1: Roger
Pilot 2: Range 9 km to target
Pilot 1: Roger
Pilot 2: Range 9 km to target
Pilot 1: Roger
Pilot 2: Roger contact confirm Cosmos
Pilot 1: Maintaining 200 meters over flying contact, stand by for overheads
Pilot 1: Roger standing by
Pilot 1: Overhead. Now, now, now.
10(c) Through the nineties, and particularly after signing the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994, which prohibited it from developing nuclear weapons via the plutonium enrichment route, the Clinton Administration behaved like an ostrich and didn’t want to know about this barter which was going to have serious strategic implications for the US in the future. After 9/11, the US began to put together all the pieces of this Chinese jigsaw. As far as the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea are concerned, the US delegated the security of this region to the Indian navy, which now escorts US merchantmen through the Indian Ocean and also interdicts suspicious merchant ships. But the trade goes on and so does the triangular relationship between the Chinese, Pakistanis and North Koreans.
DIALOGUE IN COAST GUARD VESSEL BETWEEN CAPTAIN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Capt: Very Good OW mark the position
Officer: Aye Sir
Capt: After course to 320 with Maximum speed to intercept
Officer: Assume damage control stage condition. Assume damage control and all position report to bridge
Officer: Vessel at 150 degrees
Capt: Moving course 140. Speed 15 knots
CONVERSATION BETWEEN KOREAN SHIP AND THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Officer: This is coast guard vessel calling. Coming please.
Cosmos: Good evening sir. Give me channel please
Officer: This is coast guard 344, which ship where bound
Cosmos: MV Cosmos sir bound for Djibouti
Officer: Name of the master and his nationality
Cosmos: Master’s name Kim Sian belonging to Korea sir
Officer: Length of vessel and nature of cargo carried
Cosmos: 189.8 meters sir and going Ballast
Officer: Thank you Motor Vessel Cosmos. I have a reason to believe that you are not on Ballast as your load lie is pretty low. Request after coast to 140 and proceed to anchorage of Marmagoa
Cosmos: Cannot do sir because I am behind the schedule sir
Officer: Negative, Negative. Comply to our orders or else I will be compelled to engage. Compelled to engage.
Cosmos: No, no sir. No engage sir. Proceeding as ordered sir
CONVERSATION BETWEEN CAPTAIN AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Officer: Roger this is 34. I am following you.
Officer: Hands to action stations. Assume damage control stage 1 position 0. All persons report to bridge.
Capt.: Establish channel to aircraft and alter coast to intercept the vessel.
Officer: Staff at 10 next coast 320
Capt.: Very good. After coast 320 and proceed to investigate the vessel. Close up. Action stations.
Officer: Aye Sir
Capt.: Hands to action stations. Hands to action stations. Assume damage control stage 1. Position 0. All persons report to bridge.
Commodore Ranjit Rai
Former Indian Naval Officer
“I am Commodore Ranjit Rai, formerly of the Indian Navy. I am on board CGS Vijaya, a coastguard ship pennant no. CGS 34 and we just got back from a sortie from the Arabian Sea. You have just seen a simulated exercise of the coastguard intercepting a North Korean vessel carrying missile componentry for Pakistan. It was in July 99 that a similar ship of the name Ku Wol San was seized and the missile componentry bound and meant for Pakistan was confiscated.”
11 (35) The Ku Wol San began its journey from Nampo Port sometime in May 1999, first unloading a cargo at Bangkok and then carrying a cargo of sugar to Kandla Port from Bangkok. Its ultimate destination listed on the manifest was Malta. Enquiries revealed that the Maltese address was fake and the unlisted cargo of active missile components and personal items for North Korean scientists that was discovered on the basis of an intelligence tip off was actually meant for Karachi, Pakistan. The ship’s manifest was doctored to modify the truth and conceal the nature of the hidden cargo carried by it.
12 (36) While the Ku Wol San’s crew tried to prevent Indian Customs Officers from boarding the ship, North Korean officials descended upon the port to unsuccessfully secure release of her cargo consisting of 170 tons of metal casings, missile components, 22 technical instruction manuals in Korean language, personal mail addressed to Korean scientists in Pakistan and large hampers of Korean processed food. The seized manuals gave both Indian and US intelligence officers their first insight into Pyongyang’s missile prowess.
Commodore Ranjit Rai
“More recently, in December 2002 in the Arabian Sea the Spanish navy intercepted a shipment of North Korean scud missiles, and they were bound for Yemen.”
13 (38) US spy satellites and ships had been tracking an unidentified ship in the Arabian Sea. The ship named Sosan was unflagged and improperly registered. Though it refused to stop when asked to do so, it did not resist the armed takeover by the Spanish Navy. The Spaniards discovered 15 Scuds under 40,000 bags of cement. The cargo of Scuds was claimed by the Yemenis.
Ari Fleischer
White House Press Spokesman
“We have looked at this matter thoroughly. There is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea. While there is authority to stop and search, in this instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen, and therefore the merchant vessel is being released. Yemen has given the United States assurances that it will not transfer these missiles to anyone.”
Larry Niksch
“I think the testing back in 1998 of the Pakistani - I think that the Guari missile clearly was in effect a proxy test for the North Korean Nodong because all of the US assessments are that that missile was based on Nodong technology. So I think the Pakistanis have been able to benefit in supplying this technology to countries like Iran and Pakistan, in that the testing of such missiles by these two countries also provides information to the North Koreans about the reliability of their missiles and their technology.”
14 (42) Built and conceived entirely with Chinese assistance and close supervision, this heavy water reactor at Khushab is the central element of Pakistan’s program for production of plutonium and tritium for advanced compact warheads. The Khushab facility like the uranium enrichment one at Kahuta is not subject to IAEA controls and safeguards. This reactor is run by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, as opposed to the Dr. A.Q. Khan Research Lab that runs the Kahuta Facility.
15(43)The Kahuta facility was built by the infamous Dr Abdul Qadir Khan and is based on using gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium to make nuclear weapons as opposed to reprocessing plutonium. Dr Khan, who in the early 1970s worked for a Dutch research laboratory called FDO, stole this technology from URENCO, a tri-nation British, Dutch and German consortium, which was using FDO as a sub contractor. China also contributed in enabling the Kahuta complex to obtain operational capability in producing weapons grade U-235.
16 (44) After completing the theft of technology and classified information and establishing a vast supply chain from Holland and Germany, Khan fled to Pakistan where, with the Government’s funding, he set up the Dr A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories and started to build the Pakistani Bomb. Khan was convicted by a Dutch court for espionage and sentenced to a three-year prison term in absentia. In later years the Khan research laboratories also started assembling North Korean missiles, thus making the laboratory a comprehensive nuclear weapons establishment.
Dr Jacobus Collyn
“In 1975 he left Holland for a holiday, but he never returned. And he was in Pakistan almost immediately called upon to lead the Pakistani project in Kahuta. After the Indian test in 1974 Pakistan of course had decided to enter upon its own nuclear program. Now in his booklet ’20 Years of Excellence’, which he wrote in 1996, he describes how much effort was needed to collect and assemble the thousands of parts and components the Pakistani industry was not able to produce itself. And he literally underscores the usefulness of his network of former European friends and relations.”
Dr Fritz Veerman speaks (subtitled)
Dutch Nuclear Scientist
17 (47) Pakistan successfully established a network of front companies to purchase and ship dual use equipment from a network of European suppliers for its nuclear programme based on uranium enrichment. This network created under the guidance of Dr. A.Q. Khan was invaluable as it had a catalogue of almost 4000 suppliers. This qualitative information passed on to North Korea will definitely have played the role of a multiplier in enabling Pyongyang to leap frog almost 10-15 years in its ability to weaponise a nuclear device made from enriched uranium based on the URENCO centrifuge technology.
The German hand in Pakistan’s nuclear program has been significant.
In August 1993, Customs Inspectors in Bonn intercepted a Pakistan bound shipment described in the bill of lading as ballpoint pen refills. On examination, it was found that these were high tech precision parts employed in centrifuges for production of weapons grade aluminum and have no other use.
The German companies involved in this trade belonged to this man Alfred Migue who was sentenced to six months imprisonment for having supplied a complete uranium reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Other material was also supplied by him.
18 (49) According to intelligence reports and the testimony of a Korean-Japanese defector from North Korea’s nuclear program, Mr. Kenki Aoyama, the Yongbyon nuclear plant is actually a gigantic nuclear complex, which has plants for both reprocessing plutonium and enriching uranium. All these plants are underground, fed by a network of tunnels. The purpose of the complex is to produce nuclear bombs. Intelligence sources feel that Yongbyon has received substantial inputs from Pakistan’s Dr. A.Q. Khan’s laboratories, at least as far as the uranium enrichment plant is concerned.
19 (50) As a signal of its resolve to exercise a military option as the tensions mounted in the North Korean Peninsula last March, the US began to deploy 24 B52 bombers on the island of Guam from their home base at Barksdale, Louisiana. Amongst likely targets for these B52s and other B1 bombers stationed at Guam, Yongbyon stands out as one of the prime targets to be “taken out”, in the event of a military option being exercised.
Major Estrada
B52 Pilot
“Well what you see is what you get. If you want to know what we’ll be doing if we get involved in a war, just look at our history, look at our past conflicts and it will be very similar to that.”
20 (51) The emergence of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal or MMA in Pakistan as a strong political force after the October 10,2002 elections, is a matter of serious concern because of its perception of the US and India as the enemies of Islam and the MMA’s belief in the “clash of civilisations” paradigm and the value of “jehad” for all Muslims. Here, most of the leading lights of the MMA are seen voicing their hatred of the US particularly in its intervention in Afghanistan. Of them, Masood Azhar was released by India in exchange for a hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft and passengers.
21 (53) The man who built this un-safeguarded Khushab reactor, Mr. Sultan Bashir-ud-din Mahmood, relied extensively on illicitly procuring all equipment from abroad, apart from what was provided by the Chinese. Mr. Mahmood had also worked on the uranium enrichment program of Dr. A.Q. Khan. However, because of Mahmood’s involvement with Al-Qaida and Osama Bin Laden, after 9/11 he was placed on the FBI’s most wanted list and President Musharraf placed the lid on this can of worms by putting Mahmood under house arrest and preventing US intelligence from extracting the truth. According to the December 12 2001 Washington post, Mahmood admitted that he had long discussions with Al Qaida officials in August 2001 about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
David Albright
“ No, the threat I think was very great, that if Al Qaida had stayed in Afghanistan and had had help from Pakistani scientists – they worked with the cover of the Taliban so they can import things, to use things illegally - there is a great risk that Al Qaida would move to developing a nuclear weapon. They would have to acquire the high-enriched uranium, the plutonium overseas, but they would have an indigenous capability, can we call it a quasi state program.
What we don’t know is how much classified information did Mahmood and Majid actually (and others, it wasn’t just them ) - how much information did they collectively give Al Qaida that could turn out to be useful in building a nuclear weapon later, once they can re-establish themselves or just re-establish themselves someplace else? Al Qaida could make a dirty bomb any time it wants. It could have radioactive material – it’s so plentiful and so easy to obtain. And the scientists may or may not have discussed that. My understanding is, from the reporting, that they did discuss that with Bin Laden.”
22 (55) Even if the threat posed by the Chinese brokered, Pakistan-North Korean barter trade in nuclear capable ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads developed from enriched uranium is controlled, the export of missile production equipment and the establishment of production facilities in Syria, Iran and Pakistan have already occurred. Furthermore, the testing and refinement of North Korea’s Nodong and Taepodong ballistic missiles by Pakistan has already taken place and the results and conclusions shared with North Korea. Finally, the transfer of know how, equipment and materials to develop nuclear warheads through the enriched uranium route have also been transferred by Pakistan to North Korea. Proliferation is now complete and both Pakistan and North Korea are nuclear weaponised states with ballistic missile capabilities of varying range. It is puerile to believe that, after all this, backroom exchanges between the two have ceased forever. The effect of these exchanges shall extend well into the future.
23 (56) As dusk settles in Washington on a glorious summer’s day in 2003, the mood on the surface is upbeat. 9/11 is a bad dream. However, the surface calm in no way reveals the gathering anxieties of the times to come. The reluctant US ally in the war against terrorism, Pakistan, has, with a lot of help from China, wilfully enabled North Korea to become the third nation after Russia and China to train its nuclear missiles on the US. This is a reality that the US is going to find hard to live with, as it is unlikely that North Korea will ever disarm its nuclear forces. However, having tasted blood, will Pakistan be the fourth nation in line after North Korea to target US interests with nuclear weapons?