Speaker 1:

This submarine should be battle ready. Possibly eavesdropping on the turmoil in Indonesia. Instead, it's fit to go nowhere.

Speaker 2:

It's barely enough for the submarine to go to sea safely and you certainly couldn't possibly go to war in it.

Speaker 1:

They're noisy, and it's argued, dangerous. An accident waiting to happen.

Mick Dunn:

My worst fear's that Collins' is we'll lose one.

Speaker 1:

What went wrong with our new Collins-class submarines? Classified Defence Department documents provide an insight.

Des Ball:

This really is an extraordinary document.

Speaker 5:

I see that, what you're getting at, I think you're trying to paint a sinister picture of a conspiracy to favour one over the other.

Speaker 1:

Tonight on Four Corners, the submarine debacle. Has the Defence Department jeopardised our national interest?

Off the Northwest Coast, two years ago, Kakadu '97. The Australians and New Zealanders prepared for war games with four asian nations. The first time the Collins had put itself in the firing line. Testing a submarine's principle strength: stealth. The ability to sneak up on a target and hit it without being discovered.

The New Zealand Air Force in particular was relishing the chance to have a change at tracking Australia's high-tech submarine.

Speaker 6:

They were going to be pitching themselves against the very latest, in terms of a submarine, technology; the Collins. They really wanted to be able to do their best.

Speaker 1:

But the New Zealanders were at a huge disadvantage. The equipment they'd be using for detecting the Collins was 30 years out of date.

Speaker 6:

Suddenly there was this call from up the front of the cockpit that the co-pilot had in fact sighted periscope an, because I was on board and this was a rare opportunity, they called for me to come up the front and "Quick, come and have a look," and there it was.

There was a degree of cheering onboard and hoopla that they'd tracked it down. Very quickly, [inaudible] tried to stay on it's tail, "Let's keep and eye on him."

Speaker 1:

The New Zealanders flew low over the diving Collins, dropping a dummy-torpedo and SONAR listening equipment to track the submarine as it ran for its life. The SONAR buoys latched onto the sounds of the boat and relayed it back to the Orion.

Speaker 6:

Unfortunately, the equipment onboard the Orion, being what it was, the ancient computer technology crashed, and they weren't able to monitor it in that fashion, but; because the Collins was speeding away at such a speed, it was making quite a considerable noise and they were able to hear it through other means. They managed to do that for a good 30 minutes and keep on-target with the sub.

Speaker 1:

But after half and hour of failing to shake off the Kiwis, the Australians pulled a hi-tech trick.

Speaker 6:

The Collins was able to put out a false echo, which the New Zealand crew took a small amount of time to realise that it was in fact a decoy, and that the sub had evaded them. This was not before, according to my recollection, they had recorded a kill on the sub.

Mick Dunn:

Could've got a submarine out of it that was acceptable, but when you've got a bad decision in the first place...[crosstalk]

Speaker 1:

This embarrassing blow to the Collins' in front of the Region's Defence Forces, only made a few paragraphs in a provincial New Zealand newspaper, but inside the Australian Defence Department, it sounded an alarm.

Speaker 7:

Must bring back some really fond memories for you, there.

Mick Dunn:

Yes, it does. Particularly the on sight. On the trip out to the Arctic [inaudible]...

Speaker 1:

Within weeks, the Navy appointed Commodore Mick Dunn to investigate. He previously headed up a Naval Board of Inquiry, and was the Navy's most senior submariner, until he retired last year.

Mick Dunn:

I had access to performance information on the Collins-class submarine. Specifically, in my last job, was the Director on Naval Plans and Policies in Canberra, and I spent the last three months I was in the Navy producing a document for the Chief of the Navy as to what might be done to recover some of the situation.

Speaker 1:

Tonight on Four Corners, Commodore Mick Dunn speaks for the first time about his fears for the Collins-class submarine, and the men and women who crew them.

Mick Dunn:

I thought it was better to say my peace now, take the heat that will be generated by saying my peace, and perhaps cause some people to do some things that might get those submarines fixed to an extent where they're not going to be in the danger that I think they're in now.

Speaker 1:

At 3,050 tonnes, the Collins is the biggest non-nuclear powered submarine in the world. It gives the Royal Australian Navy an enormous reach, but most of its work will be closer to home.

Des Ball:

The submarine, in terms of defensive Australia contingencies, is going to be operating in what's called the Sea-Air Gap. That is the ocean moat on Australia's northern shores, basically going from Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean across to the Southwest Pacific.

Speaker 1:

It's claimed the Collins-class submarines are in a league of their own; that they can go deeper and faster than any of their rivals. But what makes them really different is they're the first submarines to be made in Australia; a decision supposed to help turn Australia into a technological powerhouse.

Speaker 5:

It was seen as important that we make a quantum leap ahead in terms of technology, and the requirement put up my submarine experts challenged industry to meet a very demanding requirement.

Speaker 1:

It's a boat designed for fighting 21st-century wars efficiently. It has a crew of just 42, a little more than half the number needed for the submarine it's replacing. Huge banks of computers make it, theoretically, amongst the most advanced submarine of its time.

Des Ball:

It's a massive software integration programme, bigger than anything which has been done, anything which is around in other ships, bigger than has been done in major components of the space programme, including even putting men on the moon.

Speaker 1:

But the Collins' submarine is failing to live up to expectations. The process which should've guaranteed quality control at the most basic level has failed. There's evidence that the selection procedure which picked this submarine was badly flawed. There are allegations of underhand tactics. What it's left Australia with is a potentially unsafe submarine that can't defend the country.

Mick Dunn:

The Collins-class submarine is a superb piece of engineering, and it's a great submarine if you just want to roar around the ocean, but as far as having operational capabilities that are much more important, this submarine falls down in that area.

Speaker 1:

As the Kakadu '97 War Games revealed, noise is a critical problem.

Des Ball:

Cavitation is a problem in any submarine with the water and air which has been churned up in the water as the submarine passes through it being pulled into the propeller shaft. It's a particular problem in the case of the Collins-class subs because you have this perfectly cylindrical shaped boat with the propeller shaft actually inlaid for stealth purposes; and that then sucks the water into the shaft, including the air which is trapped in that water. So you get relatively large air bubbles and noise.

Speaker 1:

How important is stealth for a submarine?

Speaker 8:

It's life or death. If the submarine is not stealthy, it can be detected, it can be counter-detected, and it can be attacked.

Mick Dunn:

What you've gotta do is look at the bulges and shapes of the exterior of the boat to realise that, at any sort of speed, you're gonna get turbulence and eddies, and noise that both affect your ability to hear your opposition or your targets, and give away your own position. And that's the case.

Speaker 1:

The submarine that can't defend itself is also incapable of attack. The combat system has huge problems. Its supposed to give everyone on board immediate access through individual computer screens to a whole range of information. From the targets that have been detected, to the best way to deal with them.

Des Ball:

The system simply tells you that your number one threat at this moment is something which is over there and it allocates the weapon to that, and it tells you that there's another possible threat over there and it allocates your secondary weapons to that. It does it all automatically, all in real-time.

Speaker 1:

Even thought the combat system looks smart in practise drill, it doesn't work.

Mick Dunn:

The American certainly advised us in the mid-80's, and so did the Royal Navy, that the combat system architecture that we envisaged was not going to work. The computer power wouldn't be there, and the speed of manipulation of information around the system jut wouldn't work.

Speaker 1:

In an underwater shootout, how fast a submarine can react, is a matter of life and death.

Mick Dunn:

The man with the fastest draw or the submarine with the fastest computer solution is gonna win the showdown, and unfortunately the chances of the system in Collins coping with that fast-moving situation is not very good.

Speaker 1:

The combat system should've been fully installed in 1992, yet seven years later it's still being worked on.

Speaker 8:

What has happened is the submarines have been delivered, and there have been a number of deficiencies, where both the companies and defence organisation, have agreed that those are the deficiencies that the company remains responsible for rectifying.

Speaker 1:

This is the Sheean, the latest Collins-class submarine to be launched at the Australia Submarine Corporations plant at Adelaide. The song, a none too subtle message from the Navy to the builders.

Stressors have now developed in the relationship between the Submarine Corporations Managing Director Hans Ohff and his client, Chief of Navy, Admiral Don Chalmers. Six submarines were ordered, three have been delivered. Nearly two years late. The Navy's refused to put any of them into full service; it's left a gaping hole in Australia's defences.

Speaker 8:

We need to get the submarine on station from Australia and some of the places we would operate are a long way from Australia.

Speaker 1:

The delay has forced the Navy to fall back on the submarines the Collins' was supposed to replaced. The Oberons have a distinguished service record; they're so silent, they suck US Aircraft Carriers in War Games, but they are up to 30 years old.

They should've all been retired by now; cut up for scrap, or likely on slow headed to maritime graveyard for a museum exhibit. Instead, the Navy's bought some extra time by keeping one of the Oberons in service. It's not the only battle-ready submarine the Navy has. Until recently, there were two, and how they were kept in operation is an example of the NAvy's desperation.

400 kilometres from the nearest seaport on the busy Hume highway is about the last place you'd expect to find the answer to one of the NAvy's most pressing problems. Under pressure to keep the ageing Oberons in service, the Navy came here early on morning, scavenging for spare parts. This memorial to a World War I Naval hero, Commander Holbrook, became the unlikely saviours of the Australian submarine core.

What they wanted was part of the vital steering mechanism which had been damaged on one of the remaining Oberons.

Jeff:

He's just called us up from Fleet headquarters in Sydney, Chief Petty Officer that I knew from my previous Navy days in the late-80s and said "Jeff, can we have the part?"

And, "Yeah sure."

Speaker 1:

So what did they do, they came down here with a truck?

Jeff:

They brought a semi-trailer from Aubrey and cranes from Aubrey and just picked it up and took it.

Speaker 1:

So just how did it come to this? Submarines that are too noisy for battle. A combat system that can't fight. The Navy scrambling around for spares in a rural park.

At least some of the answers could be found here at the Defence Department Russell Hill Headquarters in Canberra. And a process that started 16 years ago to replace the Oberons submarines.

Speaker 10:

I think it's a fairly institutional belief within the defence force that we run with the big leagues; with United States, and they're all we've got. I wish to have equipment which is as comparable to that as possible which the US and others have. It's a status thing rather more than a fundamental capability thing.

Speaker 1:

But if big was better, so too was building the submarines right here in Australia, rather than buying overseas. 70% of the $5 billion cost would be spent locally, creating jobs.

Speaker 11:

I think Minister Beazley at the time who was the Defence Minister, saw it as a possibility to do things for Australia and as I say, rather than sign checks and bring in something from offshore, we should try and do it ourselves.

Speaker 1:

Seven companies put in bid but there were clear signs about who was early favourite.

Mick Dunn:

the finalists that I saw there listed some... German  submariners at number one, Dutch Walruses and number two, the British Upholders at number three, or the British Type 2400 as number 3, the Tyson 1700 as number four, the Swedish Kockums design as number five.

Speaker 1:

By early 1985, a team set up by the Defence Department to run the submarine project had knocked out all the bidders, bar two. The Germans and incredibly to some, the Swedes.

Mick Dunn:

It was obvious to me and to others that this was a straw man and was being put in there to provide no more than a presence and had no hope of winning the competition.

Speaker 1:

Of all the tenderers, the submarines chosen as the two finalists were boats which had never been in the water; they existed only on paper. In March 1985, both the Germans and the Swedes were summoned to appear before two committees of government ANPs to defend their select. It was at this time that the first questions of the probity of the selection procedure emerged. The Germans were given an extraordinary break; a list of eight questions they were about to be asked by the committee members before they were asked them. The then Head of the Defence Department later admitted it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the conclusion that the questions were known to HDWIKL, the Germans, before they appeared before those committees. But he added, "We do not have evidence that any member of the project team provided the questions to he company."

Now, 14 years later, that evidence has emerged. It centres on a dinner held at this pub to mark the retirement from the Navy of the then Submarine PRoject Team Director, Captain Graham White. What happened at the dinner, attended by Mick Dunn, throws new light at what went on in the selection procedure. As the drink flowed, so did the confessions from one of those present.

Speaker 7:

Many a pub for you.

Mick Dunn:

Yeah, we're upstairs in this pub in Kingston. It had been set up especially for us, there are 30 people, and he said that night words that were almost exactly, "I've been accused of leaking information to the Germans from my office. In fact, it wasn't leaked from my office, and I was able to deny that with a clear conscious because the information was leaked from just outside my office door; that's where I handed it over to them."

Speaker 7:

Why do you think he was so un-cautious that night?

Mick Dunn:

I honestly believe that he thought he was doing the right thing, and that was the boat that Australia should buy, and he was doing everything he possibly could to make sure the odds were loaded in their favour.

Speaker 7:

The person who Mick Dunn says admitted leaking the information to the Germans declined to comment to Four Corners, but we've established form other sources that the German team did receive the list of questions before fronting the Parliamentary Committee Meeting. It was the last time the Germans were favoured. The political tide had turned.

In 1986, three years after Labour came to power, a high-level ACTU government delegation visited Western Europe. When it returned, it produced an industrial blueprint for Australia. That blueprint was called "Australia Reconstructed." It was lavish in it's praise in Sweden for what it called its social cohesion and low unemployment. It made special mention of the Swedish Submarine tender Kockums for its pioneering organisational ability.

Speaker 1:

The Swedish boat was no longer seen as the straw man. Internal Defence Department documents raised grave doubts about the way the rival boats were assessed. In fact, it could be argued that the Germans were misled about what the Australians wanted from the submarines.

These minutes of a meeting in March 1996 show the Germans had won the project team's agreement on two key points, including the critical location of the submarine's emergency engine. The German proposal was deemed acceptable to the Commonwealth. But if the Germans that they had a deal, they were wrong.

Speaker 7:

There was a question with whether the emergency propulsion system should be placed forward or aft, do you remember that debate?

Speaker 11:

Not specifically. I think there's a general consensus form the submarine community, as I recall, was it should be forward.

Speaker 7:

It was accepted by the Commonwealth that siding the emergency propulsion system aft was acceptable to the Commonwealth.

Speaker 11:

I don't recall. I had a-

Speaker 7:

Did you sign the minutes?

Speaker 11:

I signed them. Okay.

Speaker 7:

Let me show you there.

Speaker 11:

Well that's fine, but what's the point?

Speaker 7:

Well, the point is that sometime later, one of the reasons the German's sub wasn't chosen was because the sub cited the emergency propulsion system aft.

Speaker 11:

I don't recall that that was a major factor at all in the decision.

Speaker 7:

Well this is a document, if you turn to page nine, you can see.

Speaker 11:

Well that's fine-

Speaker 7:

You can see that's one of the reason that was given.

Speaker 11:

Its one of perhaps a number of reasons.

Speaker 1:

This classified document sets out the basis for the NAvy's preference for the Swedish submarine. It shows the two points one which the NAvy's project team and the Germans had agreed including the emergency propulsion system, were among the reasons used to reject the German bid. The Navy documents revealed just how much the integrity of the selection process had been brought into question. But for the Germans, there was worse to come.

Speaker 7:

This is a document which has your name on it.

Speaker 5:

Yeah.

Speaker 7:

Are you familiar with it?

Speaker 5:

Well, let me have a look at it first. What I'm looking for is the date.

Speaker 7:

It was just before the decision was made to buy the Swedish submarines. And the annex in the back is the most crucial part.

Speaker 5:

It's a long one, isn't it?

Okay, yes.

Speaker 7:

The conclusions, why is it in nearly every critical area, does it downgrade the German boat and upgrade the Swedish boat?

Speaker 5:

When you say it downgrades it, why do you claim that it's downgraded?

Speaker 7:

Well, Kockum's claims 38 days endurance, it's upgraded to 47 days. The Germans claim 59 days, it's downgraded to 27 days.

On battery endurance, Kockum's claims 104 hours, it's upgraded to 120 hours. The German boat 100 hours, downgraded to 84 hours.

Speaker 5:

Well, I wouldn't like to go into the details of that. It was analysed at great length by a lot of experts and all I could say that on the basis of their work, they came to these conclusions. I don't see that those variations are of any great significance. When you look at some of them, we're pretty close in our assessments.

Speaker 1:

There are huge differences in the numbers. An extra nine days at sea for the Swedish boat, and 16 hours longer under the water before it has to charge it's batteries and risk being spotted. They are key selling points for any submarine.

Speaker 7:

Admiral, how is it possible that the two boats that got to be the two finalists had their specifications and their ratings changed just one month away from the announcement of the winning boat for that project.

Speaker 5:

Well, I see what you're getting at, I think you're trying to paint a sinister picture of a conspiracy to favour one over the other. I would-

Speaker 7:

How would you describe it?

Speaker 5:

I would not agree with that. I would see this is a consequence of a very professional analysis of the capabilities of both of those platforms, and a technical assessment of what they could do.

Speaker 7:

Admiral, Australia had been five years looking for the best boats, we get to them within one month of the announcement of the winner and we see a downgrading of one of the finalists and an upgrading of the winner. Just five weeks out from the signing of the document.

Speaker 5:

I see nothing unusual about that.

Speaker 7:

I have a copy of Australia Eyes Only Document which is marked "Commercial In Confidence" which shows a comparison between the Swedish and the German boats.

Speaker 1:

Professor Des Ball is a world respected defence expert, and supporter of the Collins submarine.

Des Ball:

This really is an extraordinary document. I know of nothing like this at all which has ever been produced in any other Australian acquisition programme. Invariably, what you do when you are assessing the tenders which are coming from other companies is you downgrade them in accordance with the operational requirements that you want.

For example, you take the manufacturers specs, and you say "these are a bit inflated" and you downgrade them. This is the only instance that I know in a quarter of a century of watching fairly closely Australian Defence acquisitions where the tender performance claims of the manufacturer have in fact been upgraded. In some cases, by 20-25%. This is unique.

Speaker 7:

What does it say to you, what does the document indicate to you?

Des Ball:

It raises very many questions in my own mind about how these performance evaluations were done. It might even suggest that the NAvy's mind had been made up beforehand about which particular boat they wanted.

Speaker 5:

Well, I can deny that categorically. Throughout the project, in fact, the analysis... no, I'll just rephrase that if I may. At the start of the project when we were looking at the different submarines involved, it was clear to me that some of those in the project team favoured one solution over another. There was nothing suspicious to me in that, except that as new information came along, they were prepared to re-analyze what was in our best interest. It was done all along the way.

Speaker 7:

Are there any circumstances that this kind of document wouldn't raise any questions in your mind?

Des Ball:

I suppose you could say that the tenderers were insufficiently surprised at what the Australian requirement was, that they put in their tender document wit figures that had been worked out on entirely different bases to those which were being worked on in Russell Hill, but that's inconceivable to me. In fact, the whole process of this is one of interaction, where people, design teams form Kockums visit Australia, they talk to the Navy, they talk to the people in force development and analysis in the Department of Defence at Russell Hill.

Speaker 1:

The final question which hangs over the selection process is the failure to independently test the on-paper designs by using a scale model in a water tank.

Speaker 12:

Well, you've gotta know what resistance the hull has from a power source and fuel consumption, but most importantly, you want to know from a streamline shape and noise capabilities.

Speaker 11:

Well we did a lot of model testing but like all model testing, there's a limit to how far you can go, but we had a look at results in two areas in Europe before we made a final decision.

Speaker 7:

What kind of models did you build?

Speaker 11:

Basically they're scale models and you look at power, flow, resistance of the submarine at different depths, its behaviours and things of that nature, the normal sort of modelling things you can do.

Speaker 7:

Whereabouts did you carry out those tests?

Speaker 11:

They were one lot in Sweden, the other one in Holland.

Speaker 1:

But there was no clearly independent tank testing of the Swedish submarine. According to the Australia Defence Department, the only tank testing was done in Sweden, for the submarine designer, Kockums.

Speaker 12:

I think anyone spending one or two million dollars on a private yacht would've demanded a fair higher standard of tank testing than we did for a five billion dollar programme.

Speaker 1:

On May the 18th, 1987, Kockums won the tender. It was only last year, billions of dollars later, and 11 years after the contract had been awarded, that the Navy commissioned an independent tank test. It was one of the recommendations from Mick Dunn.

Mick Dunn:

It's gonna be very difficult to deploy this submarine operationally until substantial work is done to fix that acoustic problem.

Speaker 7:

How long do you think that will take?

Mick Dunn:

Well, other nations have tried to retrospectively fix acoustics signatures without success.

Speaker 7:

Mick Dunn believes you can't fix the noise problem to the standards you wanted in 1985. Is that right?

Speaker 8:

No, I don't believe that. The standards we wanted in 1985 were the standards that were contracted for in 1987.

Speaker 7:

And those are the ones you're still going-

Speaker 8:

Those are the ones we're still going to. And I believe we can get there.

Speaker 1:

The issue has produced a major disagreement between the manufacturer and the Navy over how noisy the submarines are and whether they only need to be quiet when they're moving slowly, in what's known as "patrol quiet state."

Speaker 13:

When you drive your Ferrari at top speed, it becomes considerably noisier than driving at medium-speed. That's not the issue. The issue is that a conventional powered submarine needs to be exceedingly quiet at patrol quiet state. This is what we are required to perform to. This is what we have designed a submarine to, this is what we have build the submarine to, and this is what the submarine performs to. The submarine is exceedingly quiet at patrol quiet state.

Speaker 7:

And when it's not at patrol quiet state it's noisy?

Speaker 13:

Well, first of all it isn't. Secondly, it's not within our specifications. Thirdly, it's irrelevant because that's not what a conventional submarine is designed for.

Speaker 7:

When you're moving at a non-patrol speed, when do you normally use that speed?

Speaker 8:

When do you normally use it? Getting on transit to station, and on station if you have to move quickly or indeed if you believe you've been counter detected, or have bee detected and need to escape.

Speaker 7:

Is it important to be quiet?

Speaker 8:

Absolutely, if you're not quiet, and there are efficient anti-submarine warfare forces around, then you are very, very vulnerable.

Speaker 7:

So those people that say that it's only patrol speed that you need to be quiet at are wrong?

Speaker 8:

Yes.

Speaker 7:

Why do they put up that argument so repeatedly?

Speaker 8:

Because they're not operators of submarines. You will not hear a submarine operator come forward with that argument.

Speaker 7:

The Navy says they do not accept that those submarines are fully operational.

Speaker 13:

I think it depends on who you talk to in the Navy, I don't think that view is entirely shared. Its certainly not shared by the Chief of the Acquisition Organisation, Deputy Secretary Gary Jones.

Speaker 7:

The Naval Chief of Staff?

Speaker 13:

Says?

Speaker 7:

The Naval Chief of Staff is not fully accepted.

Speaker 13:

He has not fully accepted the submarines within its own organisation. He has accepted the submarines from the Australian Submarine Corporation.

Speaker 7:

He had his office saying he's under the contract, and it's an internal matter for the Navy to decide whether or not these subs are fully accepted. He's delivered you the subs, it's up to you to squabble among yourselves?

Speaker 8:

He has delivered the submarines, he's delivered them with no in deficiencies for which he has responsibilities. That is the end of the story.

Speaker 1:

No one knows just when Australia will have a fleet of fully operational Collins submarines. Now the Defence Department is under pressure from a federal government inquiry set up to provide some fast answers.

Speaker 14:

It's barely enough for the submarine to go to sea safely, and you certainly couldn't possibly go to war in it. It's all very well saying "isn't this terrible? Management might be doing as well as it should." But what do you propose to do about it? That's the advice the Minister wants from us.

Speaker 7:

What are the options, do you think?

Speaker 14:

Well, I think it's a bit too early to press us on options. You could probably guess lots of options. Sack everybody and start again right through to continue on much as we are but press harder.

Speaker 7:

But the independence of this investigation is being challenged.

Speaker 10:

Well, I was a bit surprised, given as I recall it, the government announced that inquiry as an independent review. There's no questions that over the course of the procurement for the submarine, Malcolm McIntosh was playing very much a lead role so that he would certainly not be in any reasonable judgement  I think. Seems to be independent. He carries baggage as many other people do in the project.

Speaker 7:

You defended the submarine saying "there are small wrinkles, there are no major problems," that's an emphatic statement when people are already asking questions about major design problems with Kockums.

Speaker 14:

At that stage in the game, I have no doubt that was true.

Speaker 7:

Have you not been looking back at those days?

Speaker 14:

No, not very much at all.

Speaker 7:

Why not?

Speaker 14:

Because we're not on a scapegoat or a witch hunt or any of those sorts of things. The aim is to tell the Minister what he might do now, not what he might've done had he been Minister 10-15 years ago.

Speaker 7:

Don't you think some of the problems that appear to be fundamental with the process of procurement should be addressed to stop from happening again?

Speaker 14:

Yes indeed, and to that-

Speaker 7:

Well, how do you do that unless you go back to those times?

Speaker 14:

Aw. Okay. And to some extent we are going back to those times.

Speaker 1:

Everyone it seems, is looking for a way out. For the Navy there's the challenge of maintaining moral; recruiting, training, and retaining submariners for submarines that aren't battle-ready.

And then there's the pressure to fill the gap. Left in Australia's defences by the missing Collins submarines.

Speaker 8:

The submarines will be quiet enough to meet what we set as the intermediate level of operational capability at the end of this year. And I am confident of that. That means, we will have a submarine that we could send in harm's way, and I am confident we will be able to do that.

Mick Dunn:

My worst fear of the Collins is that we'll lose one because of the shortcomings that the submarine has got in its sensor and processing capabilities.

Speaker 7:

When you say "we'll lose one," what do you mean?

Mick Dunn:

I mean that one will have an accident. If we haven't done something seriously about reducing their noise signature, and increasing their ability to use their own SONAR systems, we'll have an accident.

Speaker 8:

No, I won't agree that the submarine is so noisy that that could occur, that the Collins-class at the moment is so noisy that could occur. We are, in fact-

Speaker 7:

But you're not that happy with it?

Speaker 8:

It doesn't meet either the contracted signature or the signature that we would want in particular. In particular, the submarine cavitates, which is extremely noisy.

Speaker 7:

What kind of accident could you foresee happening?

Mick Dunn:

Running into a surfer ship as the submarine comes from deep up to periscope depth. When it has to use speed to come up through layers of water. When, by using that speed, it can't hear a frigate that is making very little noise.

Speaker 7:

Why can't it hear?

Mick Dunn:

It can't hear it because by using speed itself to move through the water, the turbulence around the hull reduces the capability of your own passive SONARS to hear. It's like trying to use your ears to hear a faint noise while someone is ringing a bell next to your nose. They are the sorts of things that could and can happen.

Speaker 1:

Commodore Mick Dunn's concern for the safety of the Collins-class submarine has forced him to break ranks with the secretive defence establishment, which has known for years about the problems, but never adequately explained them.

The acquisition process has produced a noisy and potentially unsafe submarine. It has also weakened our national defence. A stealthy and effective submarine would've quieted the critics. Now, only a full and open investigation will silence them.