EAST TIMOR –
Silenced
Majority
37 Minutes, 20 Seconds
September 1999
Sound Starts:
10.00.06.00
Pictures Starts:
10.00.06.00
Chris Masters:
When the East Timorese voted so comprehensively for
independence from Indonesia on August 30 it was a vote for their own
punishment.
00.16
Mark Plunkett, Barrister/UN Accredited Observer:
There was no noise, there was no cheering. I think a few photographers might have had to
stir some kids up just to get some cheery scenes, but those people knew that
they had voted for their death as well as their independence.
00.30
Chris Masters:
They were not surprise by the ruthless, planned,
systematic retaliation, they had known for 24 years. Now their country is shattered, their people
scattered, their fate unknown.
00.46
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
They were burning his village that morning and that
was the morning that we left and he said, 'My baby is only a week old. It's going to die.' And I said, ' What do you mean, in the
forest?' And he said, 'No, it's going to
die on those buses.'
01.00
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
It was very hard for me to leave because I looked
back at this family and there was a child of 9 - a small boy, two girls - very
vulnerable, one of 17 and one of 13, and all I could see was fire.
01.14
Title: Silenced
Majority
01.39
Chris Masters:
The fate of the East Timorese is now inexorably
bound with our own. Australia shares the
danger, uncertainty and madness of a bloodstained Timor. On this day, towards the misery and mayhem we
tread, while the columns of refugees file the other way. Tent cities like this are familiar the world
over, but this is the first time I have seen one with the Australian bush in
the background. Along with the Timor
bound troops assembling nearby, here is an early visible sign of a new
engagement with Asia. In tonight's
report we look at the calculation behind the chaos that has brought us to this.
02.36
Dr Kevin Baker, Clinician, East Timor:
I think it's just a feeling that we are being
carried along - not by a rabble - there was something larger going on.
02.43
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
The attack was very carefully planned and
orchestrated and it was clearly directed in three phases. One, to frighten the media out of East Timor,
and the second to hold up UNIMET and keep them in, and the third then was to
punish terribly the Timorese people.
03.04
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
They burned the houses and then tell the people,
'Come with us or you die. We're coming
back here to kill everybody, and by such and such a date we will have come back
and done a clean sweep.'
03.19
Tomas Goncalves, Former Militia Leader:
On the 26th of March I was invited to a
meeting. At this meeting they said to
kill the priests and the nuns because it was they who were there to serve as
defenders of the people.
03.48
Angus Green, Anthropologist, West Timor:
He said that all people who voted for independence
would be known and they would be killed, and that if the United Nations stepped
in the way that they would also be killed.
04.04
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
What happened there just shows that it was
systematic intimidation of the international community to get out. But I do think that we left a little too
fast, and I keep wondering, 'What could I have done?'
04.19
John Martinkus, Journalist:
I think they've carried out their plan to the nth
degree. They've really done everything
they said they were going to.
04.28
Chris Masters:
This program is for the most part, an account of the
observations of the international community present in East Timor for the last
crucial six months. While they failed to
protect the Timorese, they did bear some witness to the slaughter. The evidence of these doctors and nurses,
lawyers and journalists, students and clergy has helped turn the world to Timor
and steer us on this course.
04.58
Liz Glynn, Nurse, East Timor:
Q: Do you
think it is in fact fair to say that the international community was on side
with the pro-independence movement?
A: I
don't think anyone could help but be on side.
I think everyone went there with a clear mind. You never saw anything obvious that they were
on the side of pro-independence. I just
think you couldn't look at that community without realising what was right and
what was wrong. It wasn't a case of
that, it was just knowing. I don't think
they were on anyone's side, it was just obvious.
05.27
Dr Kevin Baker, Clinician, East Timor:
I think it's true.
I think the people, the sort of people who would go there may already be
leaning towards humanitarian ideals. But
I think, I mean I'd, we've taken some hard hearted people with us who probably
normally are conservative thinking, and I must admit we've given them one or
two weeks, they've all altered. They
actually, I think it is obvious who are the good people. I think you've got to, it's almost like some
kind of metaphysical fight - there are good and bad in this case, and it's
pretty well clear cut.
05.59
Bonar Tigor, NAIPOSPOS, Indonesian Accredited
Observer:
For my opinion, from my group's monitoring, UNIMET's
work is neutral. They are balanced and
objective. Their work is very
professional.
06.33
Chris Masters:
The 78.5% vote for independence does seem to have
surprised the pro-autonomy or integration movement, which is in itself
curious. Anyone with any understanding
of life under 24 years of Jakarta military rule, of constant, corrosive
brutality and oppression saw what was coming.
06.55
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
As far as I could see, nobody was going to vote for
autonomy. I mean, I saw it on TV, and I
saw it in the paper - people talking about autonomy - but I didn't meet any of
them.
07.10
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
You know I myself am still shocked that they
couldn't put it together, that they wouldn't win that. But to add to that I mean I remember the
night before the vote on Sunday night we visited the sites just to check them
out one more time and I talked to a man who had walked all night from another
village to get there to cast his ballot along with 120 members of his village,
and he told me that night he was contacted by the leader of the Sami, one of
the Sami government officers, saying that there was a bag of rice waiting for
him. So even the night before the
Government were still bribing people with rice.
07.48
Liz Glynn, Nurse, East Timor:
How can anyone want people like that around them,
who've tortured them, starved them, beat them, raped them?
07.57
Chris Masters:
In the months before the referendum, Jakarta's
outward willingness to release its 27th province masked a plan to ensure the
independence vote would not succeed.
Militia groups, loyal to Indonesia, emerged ostensibly to protect the
East Timorese opposed to the independence movement and its Falantil guerilla
army.
08.21
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
I mean you didn't hear much about it, but I know
they did a certain, a few things. But
then all of a sudden January, February springs up Maraputi and Aitarak and all
these, and Laga something, and all of a sudden these names start
proliferating. And then in April it was
announced by our Bupati that we had to have a militia, and so they called it
Ahi, and purportedly this was so we can protect ourselves against other
militia. And we were just scratching our
heads saying, 'What is all this about?'
09.04
Chris Masters:
In February this year 'Four Corners' went to the
hills to chart the rise of the militias.
The Aitarak militia was formed after the announcement of the
referendum. It's leader, Eurico
Guterras.
09.18
Eurico Guterras, Aitarak Militia:
I'm prepared to defend integration to my last drop
of blood.
09.25
Chris Masters:
The MAHIDI, led by Cancio de Carvalho, threatened,
along with civil war, the murder of Australian diplomats and journalists.
09.34
Cancio
de Carvalho, Mahidi Militia:
I'll introduce myself so that the people here
know... so I'll explain MAHIDI. MAHIDI
means 'dead or alive, integration with Indonesia.'
09.55
Chris Masters:
Their Chief Commander for a time, believed to have
been appointed by the Indonesian military, the TNI, was Halilintar leader, Joao
de Silva Tavares. Tavares had joined
with the Indonesians in their invasion of East Timor in 1975.
10.12
Joao
de Tavares, Halilintar Militia:
We'll defend integration, no matter whether forces
from outside or inside want to remove the red and white flag.
10.21
Mark Plunkett, Barrister/UN Accredited Observer:
By and large many of the militia were kids recruited
from West Timor, just street thugs, bully-boys who wouldn't last five minutes
in Cabramatta. And with a little bit of
display of vigilance, those bully-boys at least will be put down, very easily.
10.40
Chris Masters:
Behind the expensive bunting and rhetoric there was
a transparent emptiness to the campaigning.
Those who joined were told they would receive for their loyalty four
cows and a brick house.
11.02
Liz Biok, Lawyer, UN Accredited Observer:
We went to one autonomy rally in an area called
?Swailoro? where two big trucks came in with bags full of t-shirts, hats,
bandannas, flags, and they just stirred the whole populous up to a sense of
excitement over these bits of material that they were going to throw out, and
then they were thrown to them and people were grabbing at them. Nobody in the pro-independence campaign had
those sort of resources - people couldn't throw t-shirts or flags at them, it
just wasn't there.
11.33
Bonar Tigor, NAIPOSPOS, Indonesian Accredited
Observer:
We have proof the militia integrationists, each
person is paid 450,000 rupiah per month, plus 100 kilos of rice.
11.47
Chris Masters:
The militias appeared to have received not just the
bunting, weapons and cash, but a licence to kill. When this Government official learned who was
on the death lists he fled the country.
12.00
Tomas Goncalves, Former Militia Leader:
My first reaction was one of revulsion. I never expected that they would take this
attitude against Catholic authorities in Timor.
I had always thought a commander should fight against an armed enemy,
but not to kill priests, to kill nuns, and much less against an unarmed people,
defenceless people. This made me feel...
I had to reject all this.
12.39
Chris Masters:
The orders came from the Army or TNI. Beyond their economic interests, Indonesia's
armed forces have a powerful emotional investment in East Timor. They have incurred an undeclared number of
casualties in this quarter century war.
They have failed to subdue the Falantil guerillas. They have failed to unite the
population. They have opposed the
referendum.
13.04
Mark Plunkett, Barrister/UN Accredited Observer:
Well I think from the very beginning it ought to be
recognised that the TNI have a significant part to play under the Indonesian
constitution. It's a revolutionary army,
it has a significant part to play in social development. So for us coming with western eyes a lot of
it seems peculiar, but for the Indonesian history it's quite natural.
13.22
Bonar Tigor, NAIPOSPOS, Indonesian Accredited
Observer:
The world tends to accommodate human rights, but the
military still think in the old paradigm.
They think they should use violence.
They think by using force they'll make people follow their instructions.
13.48
Chris Masters:
Indonesia's sham troop withdrawals left in place a
force almost half the size of Australia's entire army. The province retained one soldier for every
40 civilians.
14.02
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
The message from the people was, 'It won't be good
if the TNI are still there. It cannot
happen with Indonesian security forces.'
And actually a quote that I heard almost every day from very different
people was, How could our torturers, our murderers, our killers our rapists,
those who made our family members disappear, how could they be interested in
the May 5th agreement with our security?
We don't trust them at all.'
14.27
Chris Masters:
There was no effective effort to disguise the links
between TNI and militias.
14.34
Isa Bradbridge, East Timor Resident:
Well the East Timorese have always known that from
the word go they were working together.
You know the East Timorese know everything about everything that goes on
within there - their network has always been people.
14.46
Mark Plunkett, Barrister/UN Accredited Observer:
At first instance the militias have a number of
layers. The first layer is they have the
'aratanan' and a hand made gun or rocks, and subsequent layers do have
automatic weapons. And the evidence of
UNIMET on film and incontrovertible evidence is to demonstrate that TNI were
supplying them with guns. From hiding
places this was observed on many occasions.
But many of the TNI are in fact, so really the militia are in fact TNI. One day they'll be wearing uniform of TNI,
the next day they'll be dressed like militia.
15.18
John Martinkus, Journalist:
We were seeing on the street militia basically
starting to carry around hand guns, militias openly in front of their
headquarters handing other hand guns to their colleagues and showing them how
to use them. We were just standing
there, watching that and they were waving them at us and saying, 'Oh, you know,
you're next.'
15.37
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited Observer:
We actually saw one of the people who was going
around shooting supposedly at us, seated on the rear of a motorcycle. They went around the back of a building and
we went up, we just happened to go up on the roof to see what was
happening. He got off his motorcycle,
sauntered over to a group of soldiers and they were just chatting away and
laughing. And I said to the others,
'Look at his boots' - they were the same.
And many people have seen them changing clothes. I've seen them mix together where you see TNI
soldiers and militia, all on the back of a truck.
16.07
Bonar Tigor, NAIPOSPOS, Indonesian Accredited
Observer:
We found out two weeks ago that the field commander
came to the Ainaro region and met with a local militia commander and with the
head of the region. At the meeting they
said they must take action because, 'We know we'll lose the ballot.' They were under instructions to distribute
1,000 weapons, M16s, to the people.
16.40
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
Q: Did you
get a sense that many of them were press-ganged and didn't really want to be
there, or indeed were they fervent nationalists?
A: Well
we were trying to research that ourselves and what we heard from different
sources within Sami, that in Sami they thought that there were 2,000 militia
members of the Ablie. However they
thought that only 200 or the 2,000 were committed nationalists and committed to
the integration, that the others - there was actually this term and I forget it
in Tetum, but they use it all the time saying, 'Oh, they're just "neck
Ablie".' That means they're afraid
for their own necks and so they've been forced into becoming members.
17.17
Chris Masters:
Attempts by the United Nations to disarm the militia
won some apparent co-operation. But Inge
Lempp, listening to a radio scanner, heard the instructions to pass the weapons
back.
17.31
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
In that laying down of arms, the arms were put into
a big metal box and locked with a hatch lock and the key was given to the police,
the Indonesian police in the town of Kassa.
So obviously there was linkage with the police that it didn't seem to be
a problem to get them back.
Q: So the
weapons were quickly back on the streets?
A: Yes.
17.52
Chris Masters:
The TNI/militia strategy appeared to be the
provocation of a phony civil war, but on the instructions of its leader, Xanana
Gusmao, the armed independence forces refused to be drawn into battle. The integration forces needed a reasonably close
result in the referendum to justify a descent into chaos.
18.15
John Martinkus, Journalist:
You know we were there and it was the police
shooting civilians and militias seeking protection of the Indonesian
police. So that was an example of how
they've operated and how they've tried to twist the situation around to being
this so-called civil war that they always threatened would take place. For a long time what they were really trying
to - on the one hand intimidate the voters, the Timorese and on the other to
perhaps create chaos on voting day - and in the end they didn't actually
succeed in either.
18.50
Chris Masters:
Because held firmly in their hands were powerful
weapons of their own, their registration cards.
18.58
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
It is something that the Indonesians have not been
able to kill even though they kill the people's bodies, but that spirit they
can't get to. I'm overwhelmed with that
experience, exactly what you're saying.
I'll never forget the day of the vote, August 30th, when there were so
many threats just in Sami as we drove out at four in the morning to get to our
places of observance, when the road entering into Sami was filled with this
silent procession of people who had walked for kilometres, ballot in hand - I
mean registration card in hand and identification card in hand - just walking
to cast their ballot. It was an
incredible sight. I'll never forget that
moment.
19.37
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
I think it's the most extraordinary experience of my
life - the Timorese turned out in incredible numbers. You know, one should point out that there is
a non-compulsory voting system with fears of killings and bloodshed and
reprisal directed at Timorese voters, and 98.6 turned out to vote, per cent
rather, 98.6%
20.05
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
Well I can still feel it. And I went around and they were, I just, you
could just feel a lighter atmosphere and you could feel this, 'We're going to
do it.' Nobody said a word. There were smiles, handshakes, they'd give
you this real strong handshake. But, and
I just went around just observing and taking pictures, but they were there so,
some of them were there Sunday, were down in ?Aileu?, the ones who had to come
far, and they went to mass on Sunday morning and they sang their hearts out and
I just thought, How could you not guess what they're going to do?'
20.42
Chris Masters:
But nobody could guess the scale of what was to
follow. The patrolling militia
intensified the violence.
20.52
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
At five minutes after the vote the clinic had to
close. Everybody had to go home. They had to be with their family. It was just terror.
21.00
Chris Masters:
Counting began straight away. International observers looking on say the
issue was never in doubt.
21.08
David McMillan, Lawyer, UN Accredited Observer:
for none of those counters, what was the autonomy
pile was higher than the independence pile - for none of them - and for most of
them it was significantly in favour of independence, and for some of them it
was just a landslide.
21.28
Ian Martin, UMIMET:
I hereby announce that the result of the vote is
94,388 in favour, and 344,580 against the proposed special autonomy...
21.57
Liz Glynn, Nurse, East Timor:
Oh, the result itself was marvellous. We happened to be in Dombosco that day and we
heard it was coming and thought, 'No, it can't be right.' But it was, and the next thing everyone
started to shout. But there were a few
boys who obviously thought we shouldn't shout because we were surrounded by the
paramilitary and the military inside the compound, but you couldn't stop
it. They started and it was just like
this roar, because by then there were about eight to 10,000 people in Dombosco
camping all around the grounds and we went down there. It was wonderful - they were hugging and
crying and just so joyous and you felt marvellous.
22.35
Dr Kevin Baker, Clinician, East Timor:
And the most strange feeling was that within half an
hour that altered because just after this incredible, spontaneous laughter -
there were priests skipping along the road - and we got intelligence that we
were going to be attacked and that also the second word was that they were
going to kill all the youth, that was the main aim. And it was incredible - it altered within
half an hour to silence. There were
people just walking with their heads down, young boys were tearing branches off
trees, funny old men were - because that's a place where they teach carpentry
and electrical work - were putting big nails through whatever branches they
could get. The really strong youth were,
had their old ceremonial swords they brought with them. It was an incredible feeling to watch that
change.
23.32
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
You'd have more soldiers, all with automatic weapons
just standing by and watching. And one
of the worst cases was a small boy who ran - well a small, he was about 14 -
and they got him and they hacked him to death.
And the militia were on the other side, laughing. Can you imagine that?
23.48
Isa Bradbridge, East Timor Resident:
We had the Besah Mera Puti which are the Red and
White Iron, the most feared militia in East Timor, because most of them are
very heavily trained Indonesian soldiers in militia uniforms. They came to us, to our house in a big truck
to destroy our house and also to kill anybody inside. We had, there was about 60 people just
squatting on the floor of our bedrooms in total fear and I'm standing there
trying to think of, the only thing I could find to protect us was a shovel.
24.18
Mark Plunkett, Barrister/UN Accredited Observer:
We had the right of self-defence. I regret on that occasion we did not exercise
it. The fear was that if, had we done
so, then the retaliation would have been even greater.
Q: So you
were intimidated to the point of being provoked to violence, were you?
A: Undoubtedly. It would have been most satisfying to have
exercised the right of self-defence, but to have done so would have invited
greater retaliation which would have been dangerous, not for ourselves, but for
other innocent people not involved directly in the peace process.
24.46
Chris Masters:
Three days after the result Indonesia proclaimed
martial law. This Landsat photograph
taken over Dili a day later shows how if anything the violence became
worse. UNIMET compounds were closed
down. Local UNIMET staff were elevated
on the militia's death lists. While
members of the international community, all unarmed, had been attacked, no
foreigners were killed.
25.20
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
I frankly think they were scared off a little too
easily, but I don't like to blame people in those circumstances because it was
rather frightening. But I kept pointing
out they're not shooting at us, they're shooting in the air and they're really
trying to scare us, because the only media person who was really hurt was
Jonathan Head and he wasn't hurt badly, they really did set about him but they
stopped - an order came from behind the scenes saying it was enough.
25.56
John Martinkus, Journalist:
That shooting at that particular incident went on
for three hours and three East Timorese were killed - one was hacked to death
very, very brutally right outside the UNIMET compound - but I mean all the
journalists, well there were probably over a hundred journalists present there,
and none of us were injured, and there was a reason for that.
26.19
Mark Plunkett, Barrister/UN Accredited Observer:
The whole idea was to get Europeans out, or the
international people out.
Q: Are you
confident that if more media had stayed then more lives would have been saved?
A: Yes,
I've got no doubt about that. It didn't
require much to have a wholesale panic - it was really just a little bit short
of a panic by the media who just poured out of that town in a matter of 24
hours.
26.41
John Martinkus, Journalist:
Q: Was the
media spooked? Did we leave too soon?
A: Yes,
absolutely
26.47
Chris Masters:
The international community was swiftly
blinded. Although attacks had been
predicted, there was no obvious escape plan for the beleaguered
foreigners. But not everybody remained
confined to barracks.
27.03
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
Q: You
speak Bahasa, did you have an opportunity of speaking to TNI and ?Polri? to get
some sense of what was in their minds, whether they wanted to be there?
A: Well
actually I was very angry on one day so I did go up to a group of them and I
just told them, 'I've been a soldier and you know I think for soldiers what is
important is you protect the people, but what you are doing, you're not
protecting the people, you're murderers, many of you - you're killing the
people. How can you do this? This is outrageous!' And they stood silently and I walked off,
they didn't interfere.
27.45
Angus Green, Anthropologist, West Timor:
Q: Did we
have a worse case scenario contingency plan?
A: No,
not that I know of. Certainly the people
that I spoke to in Dili had no knowledge of any contingency if things had gone
as predicted.
28.26
Chris Masters:
There were even fewer options for the East Timorese
independence supporters. Only a small
percentage were able to find the protection promised them at the outset of the
vote.
28.39
Liz Glynn, Nurse, East Timor:
Can't describe it.
They were grateful to us. It was
awful. I couldn't look them in the eye
when I knew we were leaving, I felt terrible, absolutely terrible, 'cause they
were so grateful to us and we've done nothing.
28.54
Dr Kevin Baker, Clinician, East Timor:
There was a little boy - 3 o'clock in the morning
before we left, and there was constant gunfire, they were just probing the
perimeter, most of the youth had gone by this stage thankfully - and we, I was
sitting out there having a cigarette and he came up to me in the dark and he
put his hand just at my shoulder and he said, 'Don't worry Doctor, don't be
afraid. The peacekeepers will be here at
6 o'clock in the morning.' And I sort of
reassured him that yes, I heard that was true, because still clutching at that
wonderful belief that they were going to be saved.
29.30
Inge Lempp, UN Accredited Observer:
I'll never forget, I got two calls from the local
Protestant church, Hosanna, which was about two blocks down from our office
saying, 'We've got over two hundred refugees here, mostly women and
children. Can't you come and drive them
somewhere?' And I said, 'Where?' 'Well, to the hills.' And it was that morning that I left and I
think ultimately what I could've done is probably just gone to the church and
sat with the people there and just waited with them for whatever. And basically I heard a lot of that, of those
comments too. [Speaks in Bahasa] It meant now all that's left is that we just
let go and give up and we wait for whatever comes to come. I heard that a lot at the end.
30.10
Isa Bradbridge, East Timor Resident:
We broke down and we had a flat tyre in the middle
of town. The whole of Dili is burning
all around us, people were looting left and right and I get a flat tyre. I've got 15 people in the back of my ute,
I've got belongings, I've got a dead pig bleeding in the back of my car. I've got no spare tyre. I've got one of the Besah Mera Puti coming up
wanting to burn my car down and I'm thinking, 'No, this is like a bad dream,
this is not happening.'
30.43
Jim Dunn, Former East Timor Consul, UN Accredited
Observer:
I'm ashamed, I must say. On that aircraft coming back from Dili to
Darwin we all looked at each other, there was no feeling of happiness or
relief, we just felt miserable, all of us.
But I have to say that we didn't believe we were moving out, but I
didn't believe we'd really be going and I still don't. I mean, UNIMET is still there. It's really important to get a presence back
there.
31.10
Chris Masters:
Angus Green is one of the few westerners who made it
out through West Timor.
31.14
Angus Green, Anthropologist, West Timor:
The atmosphere among people who had fled from East
Timor, I think it was one of absolute apocalypse and horror, holocaust. I think that people were by and large numbed
and expressionless.
31.40
Chris Masters:
At least a quarter of a million displaced people are
now beyond the reach of the advancing peacekeepers. Indonesians have claimed this as a voluntary
exodus.
31.51
John Martinkus, Journalist:
They knew there was going to be violence and they
were very scared, but they absolutely didn't want to leave East Timor. Similarly later that day as we ourselves were
being escorted from ?Treesmood? to the UNIMET compound we saw columns and
columns of people being marched in the direction of the dock. And we're talking a street probably three
kilometres long with a column of people probably five across and TNI soldiers
on either side with automatic weapons shooting in the air and the column mainly
comprising of women and children who were crying and walking towards the docks.
32.35
Bonar Tigor, NAIPOSPOS, Indonesian Accredited
Observer:
This is the strategy of the Indonesian
Government. They cannot lie again. All the international community knew what
happened about the situation of refugees in East Nusa Tenggara.
32.51
Chris Masters:
It is as if the Indonesian West has swallowed the
remaining population of the East. Again
journalists and aid workers have been shut out.
33.02
Angus Green, Anthropologist, West Timor:
There was occasional violence, one account of
somebody shooting into a truck of women and children as they drove through on
their way out of East Timor. Also
accounts of people being told to go back into East Timor from Atambua,
particularly younger people who may have fit into that category of being
students or independence supporters in some way, or just simply ordinary
people.
33.39
John Martinkus, Journalist:
I think West Timor's going to become increasingly
lawless and anarchic really, because the local authorities there can't
challenge this sudden influx of eight to ten thousand armed people who are used
to behaving with impunity in East Timor and they're basically, the militia are
caught up in a bind because they're redundant now. I think a lot of them will be killed by the
Indonesians themselves as they try and cover their tracks, and the rest will
continue to loot, plunder and terrorise those unfortunate East Timorese who have
been forced over to West Timor.
34.38
Tomas Goncalves, Former Militia Leader:
It's a pity, because later on they will be killed by
the Indonesians. The Indonesians are
going to wash their hands saying they did nothing and all these militia are
going to be killed.
34.52
Chris Masters:
Australia is now adjusting to a new reality on our
northern border, and it is worth remembering that it was not of our own doing.
35.02
Dr Kevin Baker, Clinician, East Timor:
We mustn't lack courage in saying that you do side
with good. I think sometimes we, because
we think we're intellectual, intelligent, that we must hesitate and keep being
objective, but eventually you've got to sort of commit your soul or your heart
to something that is so obvious.
35.21
Chris Masters:
In the last twelve months forces within the
Indonesian Government and military, without the consent of the Indonesian
people, have enacted a campaign of calculated chaos. Thugs have been armed and set on a course of
murder. They attempted to provoke a
phony civil war. They attempted the
containment of international scrutiny.
They have brought trouble to us all and disgrace to their nation. It is also worth remembering that however
many bodies we count, their essential goal - the goal of forcing a fraudulent
vote - was not achieved.
35.59
Sister Susan Gubbins, Maryknoll Order, East Timor
1991-99:
Well many of them said it, 'This is for the next
generation, and we will suffer.' Even
the priest said, 'I'm sure there'll be blood, but we will have Timor.' And that was, it wasn't very well, I mean
everybody didn't say that, but if you ever said to somebody, 'This is
dangerous.' They'd say, 'This is for our
children.'
37.20
End
c. Copyright
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 1999
(Broadcast on 20/9/99)
Reporter: Chris
Masters
Producer: Rebecca
Latham
Researchers:
Peter Cronau
Brett Evans