Four Corners charts the anatomy of the Fiji coup - from the early

      rumblings of anti-Chaudhry discontent to the fateful decision to ambush

      the Parliament. Chris Masters tackles the central question: was the coup

      driven by self interest before national interest?

      Dur 44'38

      ---------

      Reporter: Chris Masters

 

 

02:50

      CHRIS MASTERS: Tonight Four Corners hears the stories from within Fiji's

      besieged Parliament.

 

02:57

      LAVINIA PADARATH, CHAUDHRY GOVT MINISTER: So when they started with PM,

      that was --

 

      I still have to get over this, when I explain it.

 

      That was the time when I cried -- the way that they manhandled him.

 

03:15

      CHRIS MASTERS: We walk behind the barriers of the Fiji crisis to watch and

      listen as history unfolds.

 

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI, ARMY SPOKESPERSON: The unmasking of Speight

      to his people will come, whether he likes it or not.

 

      In time, his people will realise that he was a fraud.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: On the eve of another promised resolution of the 53-day

      siege, we reveal how George Speight has gambled the future and the

      reputation of his nation with barely a thought for tomorrow.

 

      When do you expect to achieve your objectives?

 

03:48

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: I don't know.

 

      That's the other thing that's crazy about what's happening -- I haven't

      got any fixed time on it.

 

      I just let each day pass.

 

      Because if I set a time frame, I'll be disappointed.

 

      I could be here for a year, it could end tomorrow.

 

      It might take longer.

 

04:21

      CHRIS MASTERS: When the calendar turned to May in Fiji, there was a

      convergence of relief and anxiety.

 

      The monsoon season had passed.

 

      The Suva Trade and Aid Convention that would crown 12 months of Mahendra

      Chaudhry's People's Coalition Government was about to begin.

 

      But May is also a month for trouble.

 

      The big Taukei or nationalist marches that had preceded the May 1987 coup

      were back.

 

      The protests were a culmination of a destabilisation campaign that had

      begun when Chaudhry came to power.

 

      Was there an opposition campaign to get rid of him pretty much from the

      beginning?

 

05:07

      NAVI NAISORO, SVT ECONOMIC CONSULTANT: From day one.

 

      From day one.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Sitting in on the early meetings was a former staff member

      of the ousted SVT government, Jone Dakuvula.

 

05:20

      JONE DAKUVULA, FORMER SVT PARTY ADVISER: We were going to turn every issue

      that came up into a racial issue, to arouse the suspicion and fear of the

      indigenous Fijians about the loss of their land and about to cast doubt

      and suspicion and fear about every initiative that the Coalition

      Government brought up.

 

05:46   

   CHRIS MASTERS: A collection of documents from Chaudhry's own security

      council attest to the Government's belief the dirty tricks campaign was

      being played out.

 

      JOHN ALI, CHAUDHRY GOVT ASSISTANT MINISTER: You could see disruption in

      services.

 

      We were getting power cuts.

 

      We were getting water cuts.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Gossip was fermenting along with the yaqona or kava -

 

      Fiji's first Indian Prime Minister the chief topic around many a grog

     

        bowl.

 

   06:22 

      NAVI NAISORO: Wednesday before this thing happened, on the Friday, I was

 

      meeting with a senior guy.

 

      And he said, "I hope you're not one of the guys "plotting to overthrow

 

      this place, the government."

 

      I said, "I haven't seen anyone "who isn't plotting to overthrow the

      government.

 

      "It's the conversation everywhere."

 

      METUISELA MUA, FMR DIR., FIJI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: People that went to

      church came back and talked about it.

 

      People that had, um --

 

      Fijian -- attended Fijian ceremonies, you know, relaxed around a bowl of

      yaqona and talked about it.

 

      And everywhere, everybody talked about it.

 

     07:02

      CHRIS MASTERS: After the 1999 election, the former union leader had

      fast-tracked a reform program with typical aggression.

 

      In doing so, Chaudhry trespassed onto the biggest issue of all -- land.

 

      The objective of making better use of the land without threatening Fijian

      ownership has vexed all governments.

     

    Chaudhry's attempted reforms gave rise to the perception the Indian was

      intent on stealing their precious land from under them.

 

07:39

      RATU SAKIUSA TUISOLIA, DIR., PM'S POLICY ANALYSIS UNIT: It was great to be

      working under a leader who was so visionary.

 

      And he was always there, finishing work quite late.

 

      But it was all most unfortunate that despite --

 

      ..in spite of all that, I suppose he had his flaws and, uh --

 

      ..being, uh -- ignorant about the way he was handling Fijian issues and

      how this was actually inciting unrest amongst Fijians.

 

08:07

      CHRIS MASTERS: Chaudhry was not the only leader to have inspired unrest.

 

      There was a strong view the former Rabuka-led SVT government had lost the

      election as much as Chaudhry had won.

 

08:21

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: Rabuka's the problem because, you know, he brought all his

      cronies out of the army, put them all in ministerial positions.

 

      These people have no idea how a government is run.

 

      No idea.

 

08:32

      CHRIS MASTERS: On the eve of the coup, while Mr Chaudhry was toughing it

      out, the Indian shopkeepers were battening down.

 

      The 42 per cent Indo-Fijian population knew they were in for another

      storm.

 

      MATELITA RAGOGO, REPORTER, 'FIJI TIMES': We had actually heard talks of a

      coup, but it's Suva, you know -- there's a new rumour starting every day.

 

09:02

      RATU SAKIUSA TUISOLIA: One doesn't have to be blind or to be smart to,

      basically, realise or feel that we were heading for danger.

 

09:14

      SUE BOYD, AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER: We were concerned that the

      government really wasn't being very skilful in selling its message to its

      people.

 

      What the government was doing, inherently, was not bad, but it was failing

      in --

 

      failing to convey, in terms which the people understood, its message and

      what it was doing.

 

      And we could see that it was losing, therefore, general support.

 

09:36

      OSMAN SIDDIQUE, US AMBASSADOR: I had tried to tell, and a lot of people

      tried to tell -- publicly and privately -- Mr Chaudhry, you know, the

      sensitive nature of the situation.

 

      But I guess it fall on deaf ears.

 

09:53

      CHRIS MASTERS: The public grumbling remained in stark contrast to the

      government's self-belief that May 19 would be a proud day.

 

      JOHN ALI: What this government has done in 12 months no other government

      has done in 12 years.

 

10:09

      CHRIS MASTERS: This is the newspaper supplement that never was -- listing

      a range of achievements and produced, as you can see, for the following

      day.

 

      It was never released.

 

      On the other side, among the plotters intent on capturing government,

      there was little to no preparation.

 

      They said they didn't need it.

 

10:31

      ILISONI LIGAIRI, SPEIGHT'S HEAD OF SECURITY: I think that the taking over

      of any -- or storming of any place is already been practised in the army.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: The coup's military commander, Major Ligairi, was a member

      of Britain's SAS when its soldiers stormed the Iranian embassy.

 

      Ligairi returned to Fiji to head up a counter-warfare unit, whose members,

      we are told, asked him to take charge of this hastily improvised plan.

 

      A staunch nationalist, Ligairi would bring the necessary force.

 

      Speight, who would become the public face of the coup, was recruited at

      the eleventh hour.

 

11:24

      METUISELA MUA: George Speight was a distant relative of one of the guys

      and that was how it all came about.

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: The story behind how the coup took place and how we met --

      all of the players -- is quite miraculous --

 

      in and of itself.

 

      It's nothing short of providential influence.

 

      And, yet, I'm not a religious man -- I haven't been to church in 15 years,

      so --

 

      And yet having said that, I think all of us in our hearts, you know, have

      a quiet resolve and respect for the Almighty, in our own way, but so,

      it'll shock you to learn that I met Major Ligairi on the morning of the

      coup for the very first time.

 

12:03

      ILISONI LIGAIRI: I didn't know Mr Speight until 30 minutes, 40 minutes

      before the coup.

 

      And, as I said, the struggle for indigenous people is always there.

 

      When I was called up to see them, I just --

 

      ..when they told me the thing is set, and I just asked, "Who's this, who's

      that, who's that?"

 

      And then I say, "OK, go ahead."

 

12:34

      CHRIS MASTERS: So, who made the call?

 

      Who called you?

 

      ILISONI LIGAIRI: Oh, my own people called me.

 

      The people in the unit, they called me because, here, they are the only

      people who can contact me.

 

12:52

      CHRIS MASTERS: The first objective for Ligairi, Speight and just seven

      soldiers in civilian dress was the removal of the Indian PM who had been

      popularly and democratically voted in.

 

      The second was to tear up the Constitution that had been approved and

      introduced by the preceding Fijian-led government.

 

13:13

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: I had timed it to be right after the opening prayer in the

      morning -- two seconds after the 'Amen' and they sat down. (Laughs)

 

13:28     

   SIMIONE KAITANI, INDEPENDENT MP: I mean, all of a sudden I saw men walking

      in with guns and I did not even recognise anybody.

 

      It was a few seconds later that I started to recognise George -- George

      Speight.

 

13:43

      MATELITA RAGOGO: Normally, we don't really see him in sulu, the Fijian

      way, and so we really took us a while to recognise him.

 

      JOHN ALI: They came right in front and, uh -- started firing the gun up in

      the air.

 

14:00

      LAVINIA PADARATH: The Speaker, even what I remember him shouting out from

      the chamber was, "You can shoot me if you want."

 

      RATU RAKUITA VAKALALABURE, OPPOSITION MP: The leader of the opposition was

      crouched with his hands over his head.

 

14:13

      RATU INOKE KUBUABOLA, OPPOSITION LEADER (SVT PARTY): And then George

      pointed to me.

 

      "Leader of the opposition, "can you please take your members to your

      office?"

 

      JOHN ALI: I must give credit to the Prime Minister.

 

      He said, "Look, I will not take orders from you," despite the fact that

      the gun was pointed at him.

 

14:25

      MATELITA RAGOGO: They dragged -- dragged Mahendra Chaudhry out of his            

      seat.

 

      LAVINIA PADARATH: Just the way that they got him, tied him up and then

      brought him to the --

 

      more or less pushed him to the centre of the room to kneel.

 

      That was difficult to take.

 

      That's when I cried then.

 

14:45

      SIMIONE KAITANI: My first initial reaction was, "Good, you deserve it."

 

      We -- we sort of reminding him that we tried to tell him -- "Move away

      from that kind of direction or else."

 

      That was sort of how I felt, at the very moment, uh -- uh -- where George

      --

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: That Mr Chaudhry had invited this?

 

      SIMIONE KAITANI: Yeah.

 

      He personally, myself, he dug his own grave, sort of, yes.

 

15:13

      MATELITA RAGOGO: The only person who was --

 

      who willingly joined these people and -- and who was --

 

      whose mobile phone wasn't seized was Ratu Timoci Silatolu.

 

      Because the rest of them were --

 

      ..but the rest of them were kept with everybody else and then were let go

      after everything had settled down.

 

15:35

      RATU TIMOCI SILATOLU, CHAUDHRY GOVT MP: I was asked, point-blank, whether

      I'm for the cause and if I am supporting to stand up and be part of the

      team.

 

      And then I stood up and I was briefed later that they need politicians to

      continue the struggle.

 

16:01

      CHRIS MASTERS: As Silatolu, a member of Chaudhry's People's Coalition,

      joined Speight, other government members were herded out.

 

      Indian and Fijian members were separated.

 

16:14

      JOHN ALI: We were put against the wall.

 

      We were to make --

 

      to stand against the wall and there were two gunmen holding guns.

 

      And that was the moment -- a most frightening moment in our life.

 

      We believed that we would be shot.

 

16:31

      SURUJ MATI NAND, CHAUDHRY GOVT MP: I was the only Indian lady member of

      parliament, with all of my men colleagues.

 

      LAVINIA PADARATH: At that time, the one person I was worried about was our

      only Indian woman member, and I didn't want her to go and be, like, by

      herself.

 

      I was already worrying.

 

16:52

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: When the coup happened, I was sitting my MBA

      exam at the university.

 

      And halfway through the exam, we were told, you know, there's been a coup

      and I rushed off to school and get my daughter, rushed home in the traffic

      jam.

 

      And when I eventually got to the camp and I asked, you know, "Who is this

      that's involved?"

 

17:12

      ILISONI LIGAIRI: I went to the senior officers in the army and told them

      what happened.

 

      And I told them that I give the order, and I'm responsible for whatever is

      going to happen.

 

      I know that I broke the law of the Constitution.

 

      And I told them --

 

      All I asked them is, "I don't want anything to -- blood shed."

 

17:39

      CHRIS MASTERS: On the second day, some of the parliamentarians were

      offered their freedom in exchange for their resignations.

 

      JOHN ALI: I was told that I have a choice.

 

      If I resign from the government, I'll be protected.

 

      Failing that, you know, I could be shot.

 

18:02

      CHRIS MASTERS: The Prime Minister, his son and the Deputy Prime Minister

      were locked away with 30 of their colleagues.

 

      10 found their way home as the smoke began to clear above Suva.

 

      Immediately following the coup, the shopping centre was systematically

      looted and burned to keep the authorities busy.

 

18:33

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: I believe it was organised by those who

      organised the marches.

 

      There was a group of people who were, you know, physically strong and were

      out there to, you know, take down shop windows and throw goods out onto

      the streets.

 

      NAVI NAISORO: You had to have looting.

 

      They didn't have any arms, so they wanted to stretch out the forces, the

      police force particularly.

 

18:58

      RATU INOKE KUBUABOLA: If it went to plan, it would have been sorted out in

      the next few days after 19 May.

 

      That's why it's still going, you know.

 

      I think there was no plan at all.

 

19:12

      RATU RAKUITA VAKALALABURE: I really believe there wasn't any plan --

      particular plan -- except to depose the government, to see that the

      Constitution was abrogated.

 

19:28

      CHRIS MASTERS: Fused with the nationalism was a mix of ambition, revenge

      and opportunism.

 

      The planning itself did not go beyond the first day.

 

      The confused agenda contributed to this slimmest of all plots being lost

      when the army failed to follow Speight's script.

 

      Did you expect the army to come in on your side?

 

19:52

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: Yes, we did.

 

      Yes, we did.

 

      But they didn't.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: What went wrong?

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: I don't know.

 

      It doesn't really bother me.

 

      I mean, because even if the world stands up against this cause, we will

      still go through with it.

 

10:05

      CHRIS MASTERS: In the preceding 12 months, Speight had reason to develop

      his own grievances against the Chaudhry Government.

 

      He'd been sacked from a range of boards, including Fiji Hardwood.

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: He didn't just sack me.

 

      He sacked any respectable Fijian off all the boards.

 

      Is this the way to go about treating Fijians in our own country?

 

      I make no apology for sitting on a board of a public company.

 

      I do that because I believe I can make a contribution.

 

      And it's not like it pays --

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: A personal attack?

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: It's not like it makes -- .

 

      Look this is personal, everything is personal when it --

 

      ..when you're fighting for your race.

 

20:39

      DR TUPENI BABA, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER: This certainly puts an interesting

      twist into the whole affair.

 

      I understand Mr George Speight was certainly chairman of the Fiji Hardwood

      Corporation at the time I received this.

 

      We would like to get to the bottom of this.

 

20:54

      CHRIS MASTERS: The government discovered Speight had received consultancy

      payments from one of the bidders intent on exploiting Fiji's rich mahogany

      forests.

 

      Speight insisted the payments were entirely proper.

 

      His attack on Parliament came three days before he was to appear in a Suva

      court on a different currency charge.

 

21:16

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: So what?

 

      All that is insignificant.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Doesn't that speak of opportunism rather than nationalism?

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: Look, if it is opportunism, I'd make it an absolute

      mandatory demand that I run this country when all this is over.

 

      That is not so.

 

21:35

      CHRIS MASTERS: As George Speight attempted to form a government, there was

      a jockeying for position and power.

 

      Even the opposition members who doubted Speight's credibility had no doubt

      about his cause -- indigenous rights.

 

21:49

      SIMIONE KAITANI: I believe George is an instrument for the cause.

 

      If you started to look at George as George, then I believe that there may

      be certain things like that.

 

      We would be bound to discuss it.

 

      But to us, we look at George as a sort of the --

 

      ..representing the cause.

 

22:11

      CHRIS MASTERS: Shouldn't you unequivocally condemn Mr Speight for what he

      has done, even though you say you do agree with and understand some of the

      motives?

 

22:21

      RATU INOKE KUBUABOLA: I have a difficult situation that I'm in.

 

      The president of my party is in that -- is in the complex.

 

      And most of our members are in that.

 

22:30

      PRATAP CHAND, CHAUDHRY GOVT MINISTER: Well, that's what you can't

      comprehend -- what the opposition wants.

 

      Do they want merely power, that every time you lose power, you change the

      rules of the game?

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: As it turned out, when Speight set to form his own

      government, he overlooked the older members, including the opposition

      leader.

 

22:52

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: I announced to him that morning that as far as I was

      concerned that was the end of their political careers, period.

 

      It was over.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Why?

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: Well, because, you know, they've had their run.

 

      They've had their run.

 

23:04

      CHRIS MASTERS: Four Corners has learned that in one respect, Speight HAD

      jumped the gun.

 

      Within Mr Chaudhry's Government, they had been talking about a leadership

      challenge of their own.

 

      But Deputy Leader Dr Baba had preferred to wait until after the July Suva

      convention before mounting the challenge.

 

23:24

      RATU INOKE KUBUABOLA: I was hearing that.

 

      Even a few weeks before that, I was hearing that.

 

      In actual fact maybe, not mentioning names, but two diplomats had

      approached me as to what --

 

      ..where would the opposition put its support.

 

      I said, "Well, we'll --

 

      we'll go along with that."

 

23:48

      CHRIS MASTERS: Wouldn't have made any difference?

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: No, no difference whatsoever because the basic foundation

      of the government --

 

      See, my desire for a change is not just a change in the people who run the

      government.

 

      My desire for change is a change of the very structure and nature and laws

      and policies of government as well, which is the very foundation, you

      know, which regulates the lives of our people day to day.

 

24:14

      CHRIS MASTERS: By day three, it was obvious there was going to be no quick

      resolution.

 

      Along with the arrival of the foreign media came offers to counter

      Speight's attack from some of their governments.

 

24:27

      OSMAN SIDDIQUE: We offered some assistance but it was rejected on the

      grounds that Fiji would like to resolve its problem its own way.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Was this assistance to help remove the hostages?

 

      OSMAN SIDDIQUE: Well, I don't want to go into details but it included

      hostage negotiation teams and training, etc.

 

24:45

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: The angle that they were coming from was they

      were trying to put a universal template on this solution, on this crisis.

 

      They wanted to treat it just like a straight-out hostage situation.

 

      But they did not appreciate what we saw.

 

      We understood our own people, our own culture, and that in time -- in time

      -- things would begin to clarify itself.

 

25:18

      CHRIS MASTERS: By now, mob rule had seen the local television station

      trashed and the first bloodshed.

 

      A journalist and some soldiers were wounded, a policeman killed.

 

      COMMANDER VOREQE BAINIMARAMA, HEAD, FIJI MILITARY FORCES: At approximately

      1800 hours tonight, Monday, 29 May 2000, I have assumed executive

      authority of the country and henceforth declare martial law.

 

25:54

      CHRIS MASTERS: In the first weeks of the coup, Fiji lost its head not once

      but twice.

 

      President Ratu Mara was asked to stand aside by the self-appointed interim

      military authority, which took it upon itself to tear up the Constitution.

 

26:11

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: That same day, the President's life was

      threatened.

 

      We got information that the people in Parliament were going to try and

      seize the President and the group had came down that way that same

      afternoon, firing shots into the air.

 

      Then we knew then that we had to step in because the very institution that

      guaranteed the state was under threat here.

 

      And if that was allowed to happen, then it would be very hard for us to

      bring it back.

 

26:45

      CHRIS MASTERS: It soon became clear that Speight had been gazumped by the

      people he had counted on saving him.

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: They're a bunch of hypocrites basically.

 

      Bunch of has-beens.

 

      They have no guts.

 

      And in that respect at least, I can say that at least Mr Rabuka had the

      guts to do something in '87.

 

27:06

      CHRIS MASTERS: Checkpoints and curfews were imposed by an army used to the

      tedium of martial law.

 

      Constant international peacekeeping duties means there's barely a soldier

      in Fiji without experience in demonstrating restraint in tense

      circumstances.

 

27:35

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: That's the major contribution we bring on to

      the table here in this crisis in our country.

 

      Because we have seen with our very eyes how, you know, undue use of force,

      unjustified use of force can lead to situations that are very hard to

      repair, like in Israel, in Lebanon.

 

28:00

      CHRIS MASTERS: The waiting game began.

 

      Instead of parliamentary bells, the compound rang to the sound of pounding

      kava.

 

      The villagers arrived to exercise their claim of ownership, the village

      overwhelming the Parliament.

 

 28:18    

      VILLAGER: I'm here to -- for the future of my kids and my family, for

      their future and for the generation, you know.

 

      I want them to be in --

 

      to be secure in future.

 

28:35

      SECOND VILLAGER: The outcome is that --

 

      that we'll get --

 

      ..that we'll form up the government.

 

      Fijian people will lead their own country, have their own government.

 

28:57

      CHRIS MASTERS: The new flags of governance of this people's uprising line

      the compound.

 

      Underpants hang in the Speaker's office.

 

      Sandshoes crowd the corridors.

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: I have not a cent in my pocket.

 

      I walked into Parliament without a cent.

 

      The coup was planned without one cent being used and it continues to run

      like that.

 

29:20

      CHRIS MASTERS: Food arrived daily to supplement what Speight insists is a

      cut-price coup.

 

      As a commerce graduate, what's your view on the cost to Fiji?

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: Of this coup?

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Mmm.

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: $300 million, $400 million.

 

      So?

 

      This is for generations.

 

      It's just not for today.

 

      And if we have to, you know, all take some hurt because of it, so be it.

 

29:45

      CHRIS MASTERS: Speight believes his support springs from the country's

      grass roots -- from the village, the vanua, the kinship loyalties that are

      the soul of Fiji.

 

  29:57 

      ILISONI NALEWABAU, LOCAL TAUKEI LEADER: What he did was what we wanted.

 

      Fight for the indigenous people.

 

      That's what we wanted.

 

      All Fijians wanted that.

 

      But the problem is, they could have just sit down, everybody, all the

      chiefs get a dialogue, solve it.

 

      And the main problem now is one chief is arising from this side, another

      one coming from this side.

 

      They all are power hungry.

 

30:37

      CHRIS MASTERS: More than a dispute between indigenous Fijians and Indians,

      this coup is an expression of Fiji's identity crisis, a dilemma of loyalty

      to the state, or the vanua, the village way.

 

30:52

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: I would say that I understand why the coup

      took place and I sympathise with the aspirations they represent.

 

      And I feel, personally, that those aspirations and the feelings of

      insecurity must be addressed in and signed into the Constitution and in

      the laws and also translated into day-to-day governance, which gives them

      the feeling of security -- that they are secure in their own land and that

      they can then have a share in the economic wellbeing of the country.

 

 31:30   

       CHRIS MASTERS: Both sides in Fiji's civil disturbance have eschewed the

      shooting war in favour of propaganda operations.

 

      The pace began to slow.

 

      The news agenda, now largely controlled by the white-collar terrorist,

      accessible and beguiling with his stock of whiteboard rhetoric.

 

31:55

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: There's always a future in negotiations.

 

      Always.

 

      FIJI TV: Good evening, Fiji.

 

      Never have both sides of the current conflict been so positive in terms of

      negotiations.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: The difficulty for most of the locals is the language of

      the media and the government is not their first language.

 

      While Speight ran his daily press conferences, the army began its own

      public relations missions to get its message out to the villages.

 

32:23

      LT COL. FILIPO TARAKINIKINI: I think a lot of them are not well-informed.

 

      It is hard, and in a country like ours people still don't appreciate the

      importance of information.

 

      A war, as far as the information is concerned, is very real.

 

32:42

      CHRIS MASTERS: Dr Paul Geraghty is a Cambridge-educated linguist working

      on a local dictionary project.

 

      So, what is happening now -- a crisis indeed -- is that well-communicated,

      is it well-understood throughout all these villages in Fiji?

 

32:58

      DR PAUL GERAGHTY, DIR., INSTITUTE OF FIJIAN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE:

      Absolutely not, I think is the answer to that.

 

      That the -- politically events generally are communicated mostly by

      hearsay.

 

      This is partly again --

 

      it's a colonial legacy in that the government was always run in English.

 

33:14

      CHRIS MASTERS: So the coup proceeded in slow motion -- too slow for most

      of the accompanying media.

 

      The negotiators came and went.

 

      There was a lot of talking -- in Fiji style and Fiji time.

 

      The objective -- more consensus than compromise.

 

33:40

      DR PAUL GERAGHTY: Fijians never stay enemies for very long, in any case.

 

      So, you do drink with the enemy, you talk with the enemy.

 

      And you try to get things sorted out in a civilised fashion.

 

      JOE BROWNE, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT, 23 JUNE, 2000: The journey that

      started on 19 May will be completed tomorrow.

 

      And at 11:00, we will sign that agreement.

 

34:00

      CHRIS MASTERS: There's been a queue of false endings.

 

      For every breakthrough, a new obstacle.

 

      The changing demands seem to indicate that you are answerable to others.

 

      Is that not so?

 

 34:12   

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: No, but I -- but it's --

 

      there's a team there.

 

      We talk of different views about the future of Fiji in terms of policy

      issues and stuff, but I think generally there is a resolve for the same

      path to be followed.

 

      I try and get a consensus decision on most things but I reserve the right

      for the final decision, and that's the way we operate.

 

 34:37

     ILISONI LIGAIRI: My aim is to let these people seek to start the

      groundwork of the Fijian government.

 

      That's what we aim for.

 

34:50

      CHRIS MASTERS: The first victims of the waiting game were the hostages and

      their families.

 

      Relatives, fearful of retribution, were largely silenced.

 

      Each morning they would arrive at the Red Cross offices to pass on small

      comfort.

 

35:05

      JOHN SCOTT, DIR. GEN., FIJI RED CROSS SOCIETY: As you can see, messages

      are being written.

 

      We read them quickly to make sure there's nothing that we perceive to be

      controversial in any way.

 

      And then --

 

      Are these the chickens?

 

      Um -- then they'll be taken and screened inside then given back to me if

      they've decided that they're satisfactory.

 

      And then I'll be allowed to distribute them and have a brief chat.

 

35:32

      LAVINIA PADARATH: That was another treatment for us -- therapeutic for us

      -- looking forward to John Scott's daily visit.

 

      We were very fortunate that Red Cross was right there and we appreciated

      the mattresses they supplied.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Lavinia Padarath was one of the group of females released

      after 37 days.

 

      She and the others were generally kept out of sight.

 

35:58

      LAVINIA PADARATH: We were terrified with soldiers around and the guns, you

      know, they were always there.

 

      SURUJ MATI NAND: If somebody wanted to go to washroom, he wouldn't even --

 

 

      ..may have not even finished, they will start banging the door, shouting

      loudly, frightening them, threatening them.

 

      "Hey come on, get out!"

 

      You know?

 

      Like that.

 

36:21

      LAVINIA PADARATH: I would go and find one of the women crying, you know?

 

      I would just say, "I think I need a big hug," and we would hug.

 

      So, you know, we did all we could.

 

36:39

      CHRIS MASTERS: The women could hear rather than see what was going on

      outside.

 

      Among the people crowding into the compound were known criminals.

 

      After the first weeks, Major Ligairi began organising and drilling them.

 

36:56

      ILISONI LIGAIRI: I think my only problem here is to keep these people

      together, that's all.

 

      Not from outside.

 

      I have no problems facing any threat from outside, no.

 

      It's the people to keep these people disciplined.

 

      You know, they come from villages and things like that.

 

37:15

      CHRIS MASTERS: There were plenty of preachers too.

 

      You could hear the praying outside and the services outside, I take it?

 

37:28

     LAVINIA PADARATH: Well, that was theirs.

 

      We had our own inside.

 

      We just wondered, you know -- some of us sort of made comments wondering,

      you know, which god were they worshipping.

 

 37:44   

       CHRIS MASTERS: After the first five weeks some pictures were released of

      the hostages, showing a gaunt and drawn Mahendra Chaudhry.

 

      There is evidence also of some clumsy attempts at brainwashing.

 

37:57

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: I think he's realised, you know --

 

      Not 'I think' -- he knows.

 

      I've been talking to him as well.

 

      A lot of people have been speaking to him.

 

      He knows, he understands why the coup took place.

 

      He can see the folly of his ways.

 

      And at the same time, I think it's heartening to him the fact that, you

      know, we look after him, we talk to him, you know.

 

      I tell him, you know, "It's not about hating you guys, you know, "it's

      hating the things you do and the things you believe."

 

38:22

      SIMIONE KAITANI: I -- did not have the heart, even until now, to go in and

      see my former colleagues, members of parliament, who now have been held

      hostages, despite the fact that my other colleagues have gone in and seen

      them.

 

      I do not have the heart to go and see them.

 

      I feel it's wrong.

 

      It's not right.

 

      But this may be the only other way.

 

      There is no other option.

 

38:55

      CHRIS MASTERS: The second prominent victims of the cause are Mahendra

      Chaudhry's fellow Indo-Fijians.

 

      Their numbers, reduced since the last coup, are in further retreat.

 

39:07

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: My best friend is an Indian.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: Yes.

 

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: (Laughs) You know amazingly enough.

 

      CHRIS MASTERS: So, but what are you going to say to them, because haven't

      you committed a profound racist act?

 

39:19

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: Yes, but they understand why.

 

      They understand because, at the end of the day, it's not about them, it's

      about Fijians.

 

      You know, the events of the coup and how I've looked after my Indian

      brothers down there at least is a testimony to, and I thank the good Lord

      that we have at least some respect for human life.

 

      Otherwise, if this is about Indians I'll just shoot the whole lot of them.

 

39:44

      CHRIS MASTERS: Denied access to freehold land, largely unrepresented in

      the army, Indo-Fijians endure -- with little complaint -- institutional

      discrimination.

 

39:55

      SURUJ MATI NAND: They stand nowhere.

 

      Because unfortunately Indians are the scapegoats in this.

 

      BERENADO VUNIBOBO, OPPOSITION SENATOR: I remember distinctly as a boy

      where we were called 'junglies'.

 

      Junglie means you were a bloody bushman and this was by Indian

      cane-farmers who were leasing our land.

 

40:14

      NAVI NAISORO: Fijians and Indians have completely different attitudes to

      life, lifestyles, view on priorities in life.

 

      The Indians haven't assimilated.

 

40:30

      GEORGE SPEIGHT: They are very particular people, our Indian brothers.

 

      Oh, these guys are something else.

 

      Indians don't know where to stop basi

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